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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The main purpose of this paper is to study whether it is possible to find distressed glamour stocks from the market, 
and whether these stocks underperform other glamour. Furthermore the paper studies if it is possible to enhance 
the returns of a value strategy by being long non-distressed value stocks and short this distressed glamour. The 
study utilizes Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968 and 2000) and credit rating as measures for distress risk, and compares 
whether the results look similar between these measures. The paper is based on two competing theories for the 
value anomaly: Fama and French (1993) risk-factor theory stating that value strategy returns are due to higher 
distress of value stocks and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) mispricing theory stating that investor 
sentiment overprices glamour and underprices value stocks. 
 
DATA 
The data set used is for EuroStoxx600 stocks for a time period from 2009 to 2018. Data for single stocks as well 
as the EuroStoxx600 index total return is retrieved from Thomson Reuters. The factor portfolio data as well as the 
risk-free rate is from Kenneth French data library. 
 
RESULTS 
The most important results are that 1. It is possible to find distressed glamour stocks in the market, 2. These 
distressed glamour stocks underperform other glamour and 3. A distress risk eliminated long/short value strategy 
performs well even when traditional factor portfolios don't.  These results imply that distress risk is priced 
incorrectly in glamour stocks, and utilizing this mispricing, it is possible to beat the traditional value portfolios. 
 
Consistent with Piotroski (2000) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002) the study finds that dis tress risk elimination 
increases the returns of a value strategy. Piotroski finds that distress risk eliminated value long portfolio return is 
7.4% higher than the plain value portfolio return annually, whereas this paper concludes that the distress risk 
eliminated long portfolio returns stay similar, but the standard deviation decreases  comparing with plain value. 
Griffin and Lemmon find that non-distressed value long portfolio provides 2.3% annual alphas after controlling 
for FF3 factors. This paper finds significant annual alphas of 4-5% and it seems that most of this alpha is due to 
the newly introduced short leg of distressed glamour stocks, since the annual raw return of the distressed glamour 
portfolio is only 12.4% compared to the plain glamour portfolio 19.1%. Furthermore the distress risk eliminated 
long/short portfolio beats the plain value long/short portfolio by raw returns (6.0% vs. 3.5% annually) and Sharpe 
ratios (1.06 vs. 0.39). The study finds that on average 11% of glamour stocks can be considered quite distressed, 
whereas 13% of value stocks can be considered very robust. This result indicates that the possibility to find 
distressed glamour is similar than finding non-distressed value. Furthermore the results show that value stocks are 
more likely to be distressed than glamour (34% vs. 11% distressed) and that the distressed glamour is in fact a 
better short portfolio compared to non-distressed glamour, since the long/short portfolio return is higher (6.0% vs. 
2.7%) and less volatile (5.7% vs. 6.3%) with the distressed short leg. 
 
On the other hand the study finds that the distress risk eliminated long/short portfolio performance persists even 
when traditional factor portfolios suffer from decreasing returns. Lastly, it seems that monthly rebalancing adds 
value to the distress risk eliminated value strategy in comparison with less frequent trading. 
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Tekijä  Juho Kiiski 
Työn nimi  Parantaako shorttiportfolion lisääminen konkurssiriskikontrolloidun arvostrategian tuottoja?  
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Koulutusohjelma  Rahoitus 
Työn ohjaaja(t)  Sami Torstila 
Hyväksymisvuosi  2019 Sivumäärä  61 Kieli  Englanti 
TUTKIMUKSEN TARKOITUS 
Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoitus on tutkia löytyykö markkinoilta konkurssiriskisiä kasvuosakkeita, ja häviävätkö 
nämä osakkeet muille kasvuosakkeille. Lisäksi tutkimus tarkastelee voiko arvostrategian tuottoja parantaa 
ottamalla long-positio konkurssiriskittömiin arvo-osakkeisiin ja short-positio näihin riskisiin kasvuosakkeisiin. 
Tutkimus käyttää Altman Z-lukua sekä luottoluokitusta konkurssiriskin mittareina ja vertailee ovatko tulokset 
samankaltaisia näiden mittarien välillä. Tutkimus perustuu kahteen kilpailevaan teoriaan arvoanomalialle: Faman 
ja Frenchin (1993) riskifaktoriteoriaan (arvosijoitusstrategian korkeat tuotot johtuvat arvo-osakkeiden korkeasta 
konkurssiriskistä), sekä Lakonishokin, Shleiferin ja Vishnyn (1994) väärinhinnoitteluteoriaan, jonka mukaan 
sijoittajat alihinnoittelevat arvo-osakkeita ja ylihinnoittelevat kasvuosakkeita. 
DATA 
Käytetty data on EuroStoxx600 osakkeista vuosilta 2009 – 2018. Data yksittäisistä osakkeista ja EuroStoxx600-
indeksistä on kerätty Thomson Reutersilta. Faktoriportfoliodata sekä riskitön korko ovat Kenneth Frenchin 
datakirjastosta. 
TULOKSET 
Tärkeimmät tulokset ovat, että 1. Markkinoilta on mahdollista löytää riskisiä kasvuosakkeita, 2. Nämä osakkeet 
tuottavat huonommin kuin muut kasvuosakkeet ja 3. Konkurssiriskieliminoitu long/short-arvoportfolio tuottaa 
hyvin myös aikoina jolloin faktoriportfoliot eivät. Nämä tulokset osoittavat, että konkurssiriski on hinnoiteltu 
väärin kasvuosakkeisiin ja väärinhinnoittelua hyväksikäyttämällä on mahdollista voittaa perinteinen arvoportfolio. 
 
Kuten Piotroski (2000) sekä Griffin ja Lemmon (2002), tämä tutkimus löytää että konkurssiriskin eliminointi 
parantaa arvosijoitusstrategian tuottoja. Piotroski löytää, että konkurssiriskieliminoitu arvoportfolio voittaa 
kontrolloimattoman portfolion 7.4% vuosittain, kun taas tämän tutkimuksen mukaan arvoportfolion tuotot pysyvät 
samankaltaisina, mutta volatiliteetti laskee kun konkurssiriski eliminoidaan. Griffin ja Lemmon löytävät, että 
matalan konkurssiriskin arvo-osakkeet tuottavat 2.3% vuotuista ylituottoa FF3-faktoreilla kontrolloinnin jälkeen. 
Tämä tutkimus löytää 4-5% vuosittaisen ylituoton, joka vaikuttaa johtuvan uutena esitellystä short-portfoliosta 
konkurssiriskisiä kasvuosakkeita, sillä tämän short-portfolion raakatuotto on ainoastaan 12.4% vuodessa verrattuna 
puhtaan kasvuosakeportfolion tuottoon 19.1%. Tutkimus löytää, että keskimäärin 11% kasvuosakkeista on 
konkurssiriskisiä, kun taas 13% arvo-osakkeista ovat hyvin riskittömiä. Tämä tulos indikoi, että konkurssiriskisiä 
kasvuosakkeita on yhtä todennäköistä löytää kuin riskittömiä arvo-osakkeita. Lisäksi tulokset osoittavat, että arvo-
osakkeet ovat todennäköisemmin konkurssiriskisiä kuin kasvuosakkeet (34% vs. 11% osakkeista 
konkurssiriskisiä) ja että tämä konkurssiriskinen kasvuosakeportfolio toimii short-portfoliona paremmin kuin 
riskitön kasvuportfolio, sillä long/short-portfolion tuotot ovat korkeammat (6% vs. 3%) ja volatiliteetti matalampi 
(5.7% vs. 6.3%) tämän konkurssiriskisen short-portfolion kanssa. 
 
Tutkimus löytää lisäksi, että että konkurssiriskieliminoidun long/short-arvoportfolion tuotot pysyvät korkeina 
vaikka perinteisten faktoriportfolioiden tuotot laskevat. Vaikuttaa myös siltä, että kuukausittainen portfolion 
uudelleenmuodostus tuottaa arvoa strategiaan verrattuna harvempaan uudelleenmuodostukseen sekä raakatuotoin, 
Sharpen luvuin, että ylituotoin mitattuna. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
In academia, people have been interested in the value anomaly for a very long time. Introducing 
value as a factor that has an effect on stock returns was done by Fama and French on 1993, and 
since then the HML (High-Minus-Low) portfolio has been a benchmark or a factor in most of 
the papers discussing any equity portfolio returns. This HML portfolio is constructed as long 
positions in value stocks screened by high book-to-market (or low market-to-book) ratios, and 
short positions in growth or glamour stocks screened by low book-to-market ratios. Fama and 
French (1993) as well as others also suggest other metrics in constructing the value factor 
portfolio, such as Price-to-Earnings ratio for example. However, they find that the book-to-
market ratio is the most robust metric in determining the value factor portfolio.  
Later it has been discussed whether HML is a risk factor (as stated by Fama and French (1993, 
1995, 1996), or whether it just explains outperformance of given portfolios without increasing 
risk (for example Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994 and Petkova and Zhang, 2005). The 
risk factor argument is justified by stating that value stocks have higher default risk than growth, 
or glamour, stocks. On the other hand, the argument from the mispricing side is that investor 
sentiment drives value stock prices too low and glamour stock prices too high.  Here is where 
this paper steps in: It argues that some stocks in the value factor portfolio have higher distress  
risk (in this paper measured by Altman Z and Issuer rating), and therefore their valuation is 
justified by risk, but the portfolio also includes stocks that are genuinely undervalued due to 
investor sentiment. This means that eliminating distress risk for the companies in the value 
factor portfolio could increase the outperformance of the value investing strategy. Further this 
gives reason to also consider distress risk as a factor of its own, and to try to determine whether 
all the return of a distress risk eliminated long/short value portfolio1 (specified as long positions 
in non-distressed value stocks with low P/B and high Z-score and short positions in distressed 
glamour stocks with high P/B and low Z-score) is explained by distress risk and other selected 
factor portfolios. 
Distress risk and the possible distress anomaly are also quite well discussed in academia. For 
example papers from Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) find that distressed stocks have 
                                              
1 The baseline distress risk eliminated long/short value portfolio is long bottom 20 P/B stocks with Z-score over 
5 and short top 20 P/B stocks with Z-score below 2.3. Amount of 20 stocks is 5% of all stocks in sample. 
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underperformed in the market, and that these stocks load heavily on the market, SMB and HML 
factor portfolios. This argues in favour of eliminating credit risk when creating value investing 
strategies. On the other hand, Anginer and Yildizhan (2017) report that they find high returns 
for distressed firms that are largely explained by the market factor, but even with risk-
adjustments the returns of these risky companies don’t underperform the market. Furthermore 
Altman (1968, 2000) creates and later calibrates a model (and a key figure, Altman Z) 
predicting the default risk of a company that includes the following five variables: Working 
capital/Total assets, Retained earnings/Total assets, Earnings before interest and taxes/Total 
assets, Market value of equity/Book value of total liabilities and Sales/Total assets. All of these 
factors have positive coefficients in the model, and therefore higher numerators and lower 
denominators mean higher Altman Z-score that further implies lower default probability. The 
paper utilizes the Z-score as one way of measuring the credit risk of the firms in the portfolio 
selection. It is recognised that the Altman model includes the market value of equity in one of 
its determining variables, so there will be some negative correlation between the value factor 
and distress risk selection (based on P/B figure and Z-score). However, we shouldn’t see this 
as a major concern, since the market value of equity is just a minor part of conducting the Z-
score. Furthermore, the paper utilizes Issuer credit rating as another distress risk proxy to 
compare between different distress measures as well as to double-check the robustness of the 
results. For example Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2001) compare the performance of ratings 
and equity-based (Altman Z) credit risk models and conclude that they perform quite equally 
in determining default probabilities. Therefore they should be expected to work quite equally 
in measuring distress risk in this analysis as well. 
1.2 Contribution 
The most important contribution of this paper is to study whether it is possible to find distressed 
glamour stocks2, stocks with high P/B and low Altman Z, from the market and whether these 
stocks underperform other glamour. Previously it has been shown (by for example Griffin and 
Lemmon, 2002) that distress risk is incorrectly priced in value stocks, and this research 
contributes by studying whether this risk is priced incorrectly in glamour stocks as well. 
In more detail the paper considers whether eliminating distress (or credit) risk enhances the 
traditional value strategy. The distressed glamour stocks are included in this strategy as the 
short leg to create a distress risk eliminated value long/short portfolio to compare against 
                                              
2 Baseline distressed glamour stocks screened with top 5% P/B stocks with Z-score below 2.3. 
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traditional factor portfolios.  Moreover the paper studies if the potential outperformance of the 
distress risk eliminated value portfolio is completely explained by a distress risk factor and 
other selected factors. This further contributes to the discussion on whether the value stock 
outperformance is completely due to higher riskiness of these stocks (Fama and French, 1993), 
or also (partly or fully) due to investor sentiment and real mispricing of stocks (Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
It has been studied previously whether higher distress risk leads to under- or overperformance 
and whether the high distress risk portfolios load on the value factor (for example Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagyi, 2008). There has also been some research on whether eliminating distress 
risk enhances value strategy, but this research has been about long portfolios and mostly about 
their raw returns. Furthermore in previous literature the rigorousness of the distress risk cutoff 
varies in time, which might not be a wanted characteristic for the portfolio (for example Griffin 
and Lemmon, 2002) and it hasn’t been studied on whether the plain value portfolio return loads 
on distressed stock returns. Lastly, the studies have been conducted mostly for US stocks with 
yearly portfolio rebalancing, and the studies mainly utilize data from before year 2000.  
This study introduces a potential short leg of distressed glamour stocks to create a long/short 
portfolio around distress risk eliminated value and see whether the short side contributes 
positively to the overall strategy. The study further introduces a distress risk factor portfolio3, 
a long/short portfolio with long positions in high Z-score stocks and short positions in low Z-
score stocks, to see whether the value portfolios load on these distress returns. Furthermore the 
paper applies a constant distress risk cutoff in time, and utilizes recent European data as well 
as considers shorter holding periods than previous studies have. 
The closest to this research is perhaps Piotroski (2000) who studies whether financial statement 
analysis can enhance the returns of value strategy. However Piotroski mostly focuses his 
research on profitability analysis, namely if operating profitability controlling increases the 
return of value strategy, whereas this paper focuses on the risk decreasing side. These results 
are expected to be somewhat similar with each other, but since current high profitability doesn’t 
automatically mean low distress risk, the analysis can be expected to be helpful in diminis hing 
the role of distress risk in the value anomaly better. Furthermore Piotroski only takes a view on 
whether the long side of the value portfolio can be improved by this controlling, and he utilizes 
                                              
3 Distress risk factor portfolio is specified as long positions in top 5% Z-score stocks and short positions in 
bottom 5% Z-score stocks. 
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US data from before year 2000 with annual portfolio rebalancing. This paper looks whether a 
short side of all glamour can be improved by only choosing distressed glamour stocks as short 
positions as well as it studies holding periods down to 1-month with recent European data. 
Regarding the holding period it can be argued that at least quarterly we get enough accounting 
data to have incentives for new portfolio selection. Moreover, indications of value can be found 
in the market based on stock markets moving without any new accounting information, and 
reacting faster to these information could be value adding. 
1.3 Key findings and limitations 
The most important findings can be divided into three points: 
1. It is possible to find distressed glamour stocks in the market. 
2. These distressed glamour stocks are a better short leg for the non-distressed value 
strategy than non-distressed glamour stocks are. 
3. The performance of the distress risk eliminated value long/short portfolio is high during 
the whole period, even when the traditional factor portfolios don’t perform. 
The first two points show that distress risk is not priced correctly in glamour stocks whereas 
the last point indicates that utilizing this incorrect pricing of distress risk, it is possible to 
outperform the traditional value long/short portfolios. 
Further the results show that eliminating distress risk enhances the value strategy. A distress 
risk eliminated value long/short portfolio beats the plain value portfolio4 (long/short portfolio 
long low P/B stocks and short high P/B stocks) by raw returns (6.0% vs. 3.6% annually), Sharpe 
ratios (1.06 vs. 0.39) and risk-adjusted returns (significant 4 – 5% vs. mostly insignificant 2 – 
4%). Further the results show that on average 11% of glamour stocks can be considered quite 
distressed, whereas 13% of value stocks are very robust. This indicates that it is almost equally 
likely to find non-distressed value stocks as it is to find distressed glamour. These results are in 
line with Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) mispricing theory. On the other hand it seems 
that the plain value strategy loads on distressed stocks, whereas the distress risk eliminated 
strategy loads on non-distressed stocks (Distress risk factor loading -0.2 vs. 0.2). The results 
also show that 34% of value stocks can be considered quite distressed, whereas the same 
proportion of glamour is only 11%. These are in line with Fama and French (1993) risk-based 
                                              
4 Plain value portfolio is specified as long positions in bottom 5% P/B stocks and short in top 5% P/B stocks. 
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theory, since it seems that value stocks are on average more distressed than glamour. Further it 
seems that both the long (Sharpe 1.39 vs. 1.18) and short (Sharpe 0.95 vs. 1.09) legs are 
enhanced in the distress risk eliminated portfolio compared to the plain value portfolio. This 
implies that the short leg that hasn’t been studied previously adds value to the strategy. The 
results also show that distressed glamour stocks create a better short leg for non-distressed value  
compared to non-distressed glamour, since both the long/short portfolio return increases (6.0% 
vs. 2.7% annually) and volatility decreases (5.7% vs. 6.3% annually) with the distressed 
glamour short leg.  
The results further show that the strategy works in both highly (during 2009 - 2013) and 
moderately (during 2014 – 2018) positive return environments whereas lately the traditional 
factor portfolios and plain value portfolio have suffered from decreasing returns (market and 
SMB portfolio returns 0%, plain value -3%, distress risk eliminated value 4.2% annually during 
2017 – 2018). Moreover it seems that applying shorter holding periods enhances the strategy. 
This can be noticed in the alphas between 4% and 5% with 1M holding periods compared to 
2.5 – 4% with 12M holding, and the result implies that faster reaction to either accounting 
information or value indication from the market increases the outperformance of the strategy. 
The data utilized is for EuroStoxx600 companies for a period of 01/2009 - 12/2018. The scope 
and scale of the data means that it only includes quite liquid European stocks, and so it remains 
for papers to come to look into whether similar results hold in other geographies and smaller 
stocks. Motivation for my choice of scope is that European markets have not been as studied as 
the ones in US, and that EuroStoxx600 includes mostly stocks that can be shorted to a 
meaningful extent which makes the long/short strategy implementable. This might not be the 
case with smaller stocks. Furthermore, my time period is mostly within an era where we have 
observed bull markets, and therefore it remains to be studied whether the results remain similar 
in bear markets as well. The reason behind the choice of time period is that the data is unreliable  
for longer time periods, especially for the Z-score and issuer rating.  
A further limitation is that the trade-off between tightening distress risk or Price-to-Book 
cutoffs is not optimized, but the thresholds are merely chosen based on previous literature  
considering the values deemed good for the Altman Z, Credit ratings and P/B, as well as making 
large enough of a difference between the long and short legs of the portfolio with both value 
and distress risk cutoffs. The parameters are altered to consider sensitivities to changes in these 
value and distress risk thresholds, but they are not optimized. This optimization could add value 
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to the strategy and make the return of the portfolio even higher, but it also might overfit the 
data. 
1.4 Structure 
At this point the background and limitations of the paper have been introduced, as well as the 
contribution and key findings have been discussed. Going forward, Section 2 provides the 
relevant literature review regarding distress risk elimination and monitoring as well as regarding 
the value anomaly. Lastly that section takes a closer look at the research around distress risk 
eliminated value strategy that comes closest to the approach utilized in this paper. In Section 3 
hypotheses are introduced followed by Section 4 presenting the data and methodology in more 
detail. Section 5 provides the results, which are then discussed in Section 6. Section 7 
concludes. 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section presents relevant literature regarding the approaches to the value anomaly and 
distress risk as well as credit/distress risk elimination, measurement and anomaly. It further 
discusses the research closest to the approach utilized in this paper. The section starts with the 
approaches to the value anomaly and distress risk, and then moves on to the measures and 
proxies of credit risk. After this the distress risk anomaly is discussed while the last part focuses 
on the research closest to the approach utilized in this paper. 
2.1 Review of value anomaly and distress risk 
As shortly mentioned already in the introduction, the value anomaly has been studied a lot in 
the past. On the general level we can divide the discussion of the reasons behind the value 
anomaly to two main categories: The risk-factor based approach, which states that the value 
anomaly is due to higher (credit/distress) risk in value stocks when comparing to growth or 
glamour stocks (for example Fama and French, 1993) and the mispricing approach, which 
believes that the anomaly is due to investor sentiment overpricing glamour stocks and 
underpricing value stocks (for example Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). This 
subsection discusses the main literature and findings related to these two theories. 
Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) risk-factor explanation for the value anomaly is in fact 
based on the Merton model (1974) which states that the asset’s price should only depend on its  
riskiness. In addition to Fama and French (1993), Friewald, Wagner and Zechner (2014), Chan 
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and Chen (1991) as well as Malik and Aftab (2013) find results supporting this risk-based 
explanation. Friewald, Wagner and Zechner (2014) find that stock returns increase with credit 
spreads. Furthermore they report that the credit spreads (and therefore distress risk) explain 
quite well the returns of the size and value anomalies. Also Chan and Chen (1991) find evidence 
supporting the Merton model. They find that the small company portfolio contains a large 
portion of distressed stocks proxied by low operational efficiency and high leverage.  
Furthermore they find that low production efficiency and high financial leverage explain the 
return of size anomaly portfolios quite well. Lastly to create a geographic dimension, Malik and 
Aftab (2013) find that in the Pakistani stock market, distressed companies tend to outperform 
healthy firms. They have utilized the Altman Z in proxying distress risk. However, this last 
result is not risk-adjusted, and has no statistical significance, as well as it doesn’t take a 
particular view to the value anomaly. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) mispricing explanation is based on a theory where the 
investor sentiment drives the prices of value too low and the prices of glamour too high. Mixed 
evidence supporting partly this theory and partly the risk-factor theory is found by for example 
Vassalou and Xing (2004), who find that distress risk explains size and value portfolio returns 
to some extent, but the value anomaly still significantly persists after this effect is taken into 
account. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) find similar results concluding that value strategy profits 
are not fully explained by elevated distress risk, but distress risk still explains some of the value 
outperformance. Griffin and Lemmon use the Ohlson’s O-score to proxy the default probability , 
which utilizes similar information as Altman Z does but with slightly different ratios. In general 
it seems that Altman Z is used more often than the Ohlson’s O as well as the Altman Z is 
commented to be the industry standard by for example Dichev (1998). Therefore this paper 
utilizes Altman Z instead of the Ohlson’s O as the distress proxy. These previously discussed 
results suggest that some of the value strategy return might be explained by elevated distress 
risk, yet some of the return is still left unexplained by riskiness.  
There are also some results arguing that the whole value anomaly is due to mispricing, and the 
effect of distress risk in explaining that anomaly is insignificant. These papers include Dichev 
(1998), Petkova and Zhang (2005) and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008). They find that 
high distress risk companies underperform, but they do not find relation between size or value 
and distress. Dichev (1998) uses both Altman Z and Ohlson’s O as proxies for distress risk, and 
finds that they work quite similarly, while Z-score is commented to be the industry standard for 
the distress risk measure. Petkova and Zhang (2005) on the other hand find that value stocks 
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have slightly higher market betas when comparing with growth stocks and utilizing the 
expected market risk premium instead of the realized one. However, this loading is not nearly 
enough to explain the value anomaly. Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) find that the 
distress risk underperformance is the largest in the smallest stocks and the most glamorous 
stocks. This implies that both the long side of the value portfolio (small companies in general) 
and the short side (glamour stocks) portfolio might be enhanced by taking into account the 
distress risk (i.e. distressed glamour stocks chosen in the short side, and non-distressed value 
stocks in the long side). Lastly, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) find that distress risk drives the 
Momentum anomaly, and that high distress risk stocks suffer from low returns. However, they 
also conclude that size and value don’t seem to explain distress risk and therefore small stocks 
or value stocks don’t seem to have higher distress risk than larger or more glamorous stocks. 
2.2 Review of distress risk measurement and anomaly 
This subsection recaps the relevant literature regarding credit/distress risk measures, as well as 
it introduces results taking a view whether a distress risk anomaly exists. 
As shortly mentioned previously, Altman (1968, 2000) has created a key figure, Altman Z, 
measuring distress risk. This figure contains the information of five ratios: Working 
capital/Total assets, Retained earnings/Total assets, Earnings before interest and taxes/Total 
assets, Market value of equity/Book value of total liabilities and Sales/Total assets. Altman ends 
up with this model by looking at plenty of fundamental variables possibly explaining distress 
risk. He finds that these remaining five variables are the most significant in determining the 
distress risk of a company. The Z-score has been utilized in distress risk anomaly research quite 
a lot and it is commented to be the industry standard by for example Dichev (1998). Therefore 
Altman Z is utilized as a distress risk measure in this paper.  
Issuer credit rating has not been utilized in explaining the distress risk anomaly to similar extent 
as Altman Z has, but Nickell, Perraudin and Varotto (2001) compare the performance of ratings 
and equity-based (Altman Z) distress risk measures and conclude that they perform quite 
equally in determining default probabilities. This gives an incentive to look into the issuer rating 
based distress risk measurement as well. There is one large upside in measuring distress risk 
with ratings, and that is that by construction it does not have a similar built-in negative 
correlation with value strategy that the Z-score has. This correlation is due to value portfolio 
selection being based on low market value of equity (compared to book value), whereas Z-score 
selection is partly based on high market value of equity (compared to liabilities). The problem 
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should be considered minor, since this is just one part of the Z-score and the underlying ratio is 
not completely the same either, but anyway it is prudent to have another way of measuring 
distress risk for overall robustness. A further positive attribute of the rating based approach is 
that it does not necessarily take as large of a view on the companies’ current operating 
profitability as for example Piotroski F does (Piotroski, 2000). This means that the ratings based 
measure might be more appropriate in capturing the distress risk component instead of the 
operating profitability, which might be an attribute of the value strategy already (result that P/E 
and P/B value portfolio returns explain each other as stated by Fama and French, 1993). 
Lastly regarding the distress risk measurement, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) find that 
accounting-based distress risk measures (such as Altman Z for example) are able to outperform 
the market-based measures (such as credit spreads) when creating a distress risk anomaly 
portfolio. This finding gives the incentive to utilize rating and Altman Z based distress risk 
proxies instead of for example credit spread proxies.  
On the distress risk anomaly, the findings have been quite mixed. Malik and Aftab (2013) use 
the Z-score as a proxy for distress risk in the Pakistani stock market, and find that distressed 
companies outperform non-distressed ones. However, they do not take into account other 
factors than distress risk explaining this phenomenon (for example size factor), and their result 
is not statistically significant. Furthermore Anginer and Yildizhan (2017) find that the market 
beta seems to capture all of the return of distress risk anomaly, and therefore the distress risk 
anomaly does not seem to exist in their sample but it is captured in the market betas instead.  
Their result implies that distress risk is on average priced correctly in the market.  
On the other hand Agarwal and Bauer (2014) notice that with many measures of distress risk, 
both market and accounting based, low distress risk companies outperform the distressed ones. 
Furthermore they find that Z-score is able to include all the pricing information from the market 
model (CDS based), but this does not apply the other way around. This result again argues in 
favour of using the Z-score as a distress risk proxy. As stated previously, also Dichev (1998), 
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) and Agarwal and Taffler’s (2008) find that non-
distressed companies outperform distressed ones. Furthermore Dichev (1998) as well as 
Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) find that size and value factors are unable to explain 
this distress anomaly. Agarwal and Taffler (2008) find that Momentum explains the distress 
risk anomaly whereas Wu (2010) doesn’t find similar results on Momentum. Both of them 
conclude that value and size do not explain the distress risk anomaly. 
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2.3 Details of most relevant research on value and distress risk 
The closest to what is done in this paper can be seen in Piotroski (2000) paper. The main 
differences between these approaches are that Piotroski uses Piotroski F as his distress risk 
measure excluding this risk from the value strategy whereas this paper utilizes the Altman Z-
score. From these figures, the Piotroski F takes more view to the current operating profitabilit y 
(6 out of 9 measures are for profitability), whereas the Altman Z-score focuses more on the risk. 
Furthermore, Piotroski (2000) only considers the long portfolio of the value strategy (i.e. high 
B/M companies), whereas this paper focuses on the short side of value anomaly introducing a 
short portfolio of distressed glamour stocks. Moreover, this paper utilizes European data from 
2009 to 2018, and rebalances the portfolio as frequently as monthly, whereas Piotroski uses US 
data until year 2000, and rebalances his portfolios either annually or biannually. Lastly, 
Piotroski doesn’t look into whether his new strategy loads on different benchmark portfolios. 
He looks into what kind of companies are left in the long portfolio (small value), but he doesn’t 
take a look whether the returns of this new portfolio still load on the SMB, HML, MOM or 
other factor portfolios. This paper focuses on whether the strategy loads especially on SMB, 
HML and distress risk factor portfolios, but also on other selected factor portfolios and whether 
the strategy alpha remains significant after these controls.  
Piotroski’s (2000) findings are that accounting-based fundamental analysis can improve the 
value long portfolio returns significantly. He finds that by choosing financially strong value 
stocks, he can improve the long portfolio raw returns by 7.4% annually. He also finds that the 
most benefit can be found in small companies with no analyst following, which sounds 
intuitive; It is possible to create value with one’s own analysis when the data and information 
regarding that specific company is hard to find. It is likely that this study finds similar 
outperformance, but the outperformance of this paper is likely to originate from the reduced 
risk rather than increased return. Then of course via leverage the risk or return can be matched, 
but this comment is merely to illustrate the difference in portfolio construction. Furthermore 
this paper is expected to shed more light on what factor portfolios explain the returns of a 
distress risk eliminated long/short value portfolio whereas Piotroski (2000) looks whether his 
long portfolio includes small value companies. 
Furthermore, in table 1 one can see a comparison between the methodology, scope and focus 
of this paper and previous papers on the subject. One can see that previously raw returns on 
long portfolios have been the focus area on the topic, and the US market has been in the scope 
of these studies. Further we can see that only Piotroski (2000) has utilized an approach where 
11 
 
he simultaneously includes constant distress thresholds in time and selects constant amount of 
companies in the long portfolio. Moreover we notice that the portion of stocks in the long 
portfolio has mostly been between 2-11% only time-varying in the study of Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008), where the portion of stocks in the portfolio should be between 0% and 20% at all times.  
In this paper a constant 5% of all stocks are chosen in both the long and short portfolio with a 
constant distress risk cutoff and time-varying P/B thresholds. Moreover this paper introduces a 
short portfolio of distressed glamour stocks, and monitors the long/short portfolio loadings on 
a distress risk factor portfolio as well as FF5 + MOM factor portfolios. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of methodology, scope and focus of papers regarding value and 
distress  
 
  
Paper Value methodology Distress methodology Geography Focus
Portion of stocks 
selected in the long 
portfolio
Friewald, Wagner and 
Zechner (2014)
Three categories for B/M 
(percentiles)
Three categories for CDS 
(percentiles)
US
Long portfolio return, Raw and 
FF3
11%
Vassalou and Xing 
(2004)
3-5 categories for B/M 
(percentiles)
3-5 categories on own 
bankruptcy prediction model 
(percentiles)
US
Long portfolio return, Raw and 
FF3
4-11%
Griffin and Lemmon 
(2002) 
Three categories for B/M 
(percentiles)
Three categories for 
Ohlson's O (percentiles)
US
Long portfolio return, Raw and 
FF3
11%
Petkova and Zhang 
(2005) 
HML (5x5 size and value, 
small value minus small 
growth, percentiles)
No cutoff US
Whether small HML loads on 
expected market return factor
4%
Campbell, Hilscher and 
Szilagyi (2008)
No cutoff
20 categories based on own 
bankruptcy prediction model 
(percentiles)
US
Whether distressed stocks load on 
size, market and HML factors
5%
Agarwal and Taffler 
(2008) 
Five categories for B/M 
(percentiles)
Constant thresholds on 
scaled Altman Z (<0 and >0)
US
Whether Momentum proxies 
distress risk and whether size and 
B/M are linked with distress. Long 
portfolio
Varies in time and 
cannot be monitored. 
Should be between 0 
and 20%
Piotroski (2000)
Five categories for B/M 
(percentiles)
Nine categories on Piotroski 
F (constant)
US Raw return 2-5%
My paper (2018)
5% of total stocks in both 
long and short by B/M 
that comply distress rule.
Constant thresholds on 
Altman Z (<2.3 and >5)
EU
Long/Short portfolio, loading on 
distress factor controlling for FF5 
+ Mom
5%
Value and distress
12 
 
3 HYPOTHESES 
Linked to the discussions between Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996), Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994) and many more, the hypotheses in this paper are based on theories that the 
outperformance of the value strategy is to some extent due to higher distress risk (Fama and 
French, 1993) of the companies in the value strategy long portfolio and to some extent due to 
investor sentiment (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) underpricing value stocks and 
overpricing glamour stocks. The first hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
1) The plain value portfolio stocks are more distressed than plain glamour portfolio stocks. 
The above hypothesis is based on the Fama and French (1993) theory that the HML factor is in 
fact a factor capturing higher riskiness of value stocks compared to glamour. This is tested by 
creating a distress risk factor based on Altman Z, and looking into whether the traditional value 
strategy portfolio loads significantly on this factor. Furthermore the paper compares the 
proportion of distressed stocks in the value long and short portfolios to conclude whether one 
of them has higher credit risk by construction. It is expected that the value portfolio includes 
more distressed stocks than the glamour portfolio, but it is still possible to find some non-
distressed value stocks. This would imply that part of the value portfolio outperformance is due 
to mispricing, which leads to the second hypothesis: 
2) Eliminating distress risk exposure from the plain value portfolio enhances the portfolio 
performance. 
This is based on Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) theory that some of the value stock 
anomaly is due to mispricing caused by investor sentiment. Regarding this, the paper looks into 
whether the cumulative return and Sharpe ratio of the distress risk eliminated value strategy are 
higher than those of the plain value strategy. Further the return of the distress risk eliminated 
value strategy is regressed against chosen benchmark portfolios and seen whether positive and 
significant alphas persist. Furthermore, the paper looks into whether this distress risk eliminated 
value strategy loads on the SMB, HML and distress risk factors specifically. In this paper a 
short leg for distress risk eliminated value strategy is introduced. This short portfolio consists 
of distressed glamour stocks. The third hypothesis relates to this short portfolio and can be 
formulated as: 
3) It is possible to find distressed glamour stocks from the market, and these stocks 
underperform compared to other glamour stocks. 
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This hypothesis is again based on Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) theory that investor 
sentiment creates mispricing in the market. The paper argues that since it seems to be possible 
to find non-distressed value stocks to be long, it is also possible to find distressed glamour 
stocks to be short. The paper first studies whether distressed glamour stocks can be found in the 
market, and later looks into whether this short leg of distressed glamour creates more value than 
a short leg of non-distressed glamour. 
 
4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This section first discusses the data selection process, as well as the scale and scope of the data. 
Later the section covers the methodology used in portfolio construction and rebalancing as well 
as in the calculation of returns. Lastly it discusses the benchmark portfolios and introduces 
regression models used. 
4.1 Data 
The paper utilizes monthly data for EuroStoxx600 companies including total returns, Price-to-
Book ratios, Altman Z figures and Issuer ratings from Thomson Reuters Eikon for the period 
of 01/2009 – 12/2018. Furthermore, the EuroStoxx600 index total return for the same time 
period is used as the benchmark market return, since it is the closest market return benchmark 
for this population of companies. The time period from 2009 to 2018 is chosen due to 
limitations of data before year 2009. Practically this is due to unavailability of good quality 
Altman Z figures and Issuer ratings. Moreover, the paper is most interested in the recent 
performance of the distress risk eliminated value strategy, and therefore choosing the most 
recent data also fits into the scope of the study.  
After collecting the data, it is controlled rigorously to notice possible inconsistencies as well as 
missing values. It seems that good quality time series data is available for 388 companies for 
the Altman Z and 245 companies for the Issuer rating for the time period in scope. Therefore 
the sample companies going forward are these 388 for the Altman Z based strategy and 245 for 
the Ratings-based approach. Furthermore as the benchmark value portfolio creation, the paper 
utilizes the same 388 companies as for the Altman Z based value strategy. This is to make sure 
that the comparison is made between companies from the same sample space. Also the distress 
risk factor portfolio is created from the Altman Z consistent data.  
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As discussed in the chapter above, the market and distress risk factor portfolio returns are 
calculated based on the EuroStoxx600 data. Other factor portfolio returns, as well as the risk-
free rate are fetched from the Kenneth French data library, utilizing the European monthly data 
there. From this source the FF5 portfolios and the Momentum portfolio (SMB, HML, MOM, 
RMW, CMA) are chosen as the additional factor portfolios.  
Below in table 2 one can see descriptive statistics of the data set utilized. The portfolio selection 
is covered in more detail in the methodology section. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive information on the data used in portfolio selection 
In the below table one can see descriptive information of the data fetched from Thomson Reuters to create the 
distress risk eliminated value portfolio. This is time series data for years 2009 – 2018 of monthly total return, P/B, 
Altman Z-score and Issuer rating for all EuroStoxx600 companies. For Altman Z portfolio selection 20 stocks 
(Altman Z over 5, 20 lowest P/B figures) are chosen in the long portfolio and 20 stocks (Altman Z under 2.3, 20 
highest P/B figures) in the short portfolio based on the Altman Z and P/B figures. For the rating based approach, 
20 lowest P/B companies with a rating better than A+ are selected in the long portfolio and 20 highest P/B 
companies with rating lower than BBB in the short portfolio. In the plain value portfolio 20 lowest P/B stocks are 
chosen in the long portfolio and 20 highest P/B stocks in the short portfolio. 
 
(1) The respective figure must be higher for the company to be chosen in the portfolio . 
(2) The respective figure must be lower for the company to be chosen in the portfolio.  
 
The paper also looks into the data to see whether the overall distress risk seems to be higher in 
the plain value long portfolio compared to the short portfolio. In table 3 below you can see the 
results of this analysis. From this table we can see that the value long portfolio includes more 
distressed companies by all measures, which indicates that at each point in time the value long 
portfolio is likely to include more distress risk than the short portfolio. This argues in favour of 
the risk-based approach i.e. that the value anomaly might be at least partly due to higher distress 
risk in the long portfolio compared to the short portfolio. Furthermore this result motivates to 
study whether it is possible to exclude the distress risk from the value long portfolio and still 
outperform the market with the value strategy. 
Raw data Altman Z control Rating control W/o distress control
No. of companies 600 388 245 388
No. of months (time points) 120 120 120 120
Time period 01/2009 - 12/2018 01/2009 - 12/2018 01/2009 - 12/2018 01/2009 - 12/2018
No. of long positions - 20 20 20
No. of short positions - 20 20 20
Z long boundary (1) - 5 - -
Z short boundary (2) - 2.3 - -
Rating long boundary (1) - - A+ -
Rating short boundary (2) - - BBB -
P/B, average realized long boundary (2) - 1.79 1.45 0.74
P/B, average realized short boundary (1) - 3.12 2.57 9.23
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Table 3: Aggregated distress risk of plain value long and short portfolios  
In this table one can see statistics of the average Z-scores and Ratings for the plain value long and short portfolios, 
where the lowest 20 P/B stocks are chosen in the long portfolio and 20 highest P/B stocks in the short portfolio for 
each month. Regarding the calculations, first an average is computed for each portfolio in each time point, and 
then the quartiles, average, minimum and maximum are calculated from the portfolio level time series data.  
 
 
Further the paper introduces a short portfolio of distressed glamour stocks. This is based on an 
argument that since it seems that it is possible to be long non-distressed value stocks (Piotroski, 
2000, Griffin and Lemmon, 2002) it could be possible to find distressed glamour stocks to be 
short. Tables 4 - 9 below show descriptive statistics on the proportions of distressed/non-
distressed value and glamour stocks during 2009 - 2018. First table 4 illustrates the shares of 
value and glamour stocks within the sample. We can see that the median share of value stocks 
(proxied by P/B < 2) is 38.1% and the median share of glamour stocks (proxied by P/B > 3) is 
38.7%. This amount is specified larger than the usual share of value and glamour stocks of 20% 
chosen in value long/short portfolios, since otherwise the amount of stocks would be too sma ll 
to further divide into distress categories. The current amount of value and glamour stocks 
provides sample sizes large enough to divide them into distress risk categories.  
Tables 5 – 9 show that the proportion of most distressed stocks is much larger in value stocks 
than it is in glamour stocks (34% vs. 11% on average) and similarly the share of least distressed 
stocks is far higher among the glamour stocks than it is in value stocks (57% vs. 13%). We also 
notice that the proportion of the least distressed value stocks is around as large as the proportion 
of most distressed glamour stocks (11% vs. 13%). This indicates that it is roughly as possible 
to find non-distressed value stocks as it is to find distressed glamour stocks. Furthermore in 
table 9 we see that the difference between the proportions of value and glamour stocks varies  
so that the more distressed the stocks are, the larger is the share of value stocks compared to 
glamour. Lastly we can see in tables 5 and 6 that the possibility to find the least distressed value 
Z-score Rating Z-score Rating
Count 120 120 120 120
Mean 4.5 A+ 15.6 AA+
Min 1.4 BBB 4.6 AA-
25% 2.4 A 10.9 AA
50% 4.1 A+ 13.7 AA+
75% 5.5 AA- 22.1 AA+
Max 16.1 AA 34.0 AAA
Value long Value short
Average distress of portfolio at each point in time
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stocks and most distressed glamour stocks in the whole sample has been similar (between 4.4% 
and 5.9% for least distressed value and between 3.4% and 4.6% for most distressed glamour in 
the first and third quantiles). This again indicates that it is equally likely to find distressed 
glamour stocks as it is to find non-distressed value.  
To give some examples of these distressed glamour stocks, we can look at Tesla (P/B ratio 13.3 
and Z-score 1.3 at the end of 2018) and Outotec (P/B ratio 3.5 and Z-score 2.1 in mid-2018). 
The price of Outotec has fluctuated a lot between 2.5€ and 13€ during 2009 - 2018, but the 
returns of the stock during times when the short position has been open is -35.3% annually, 
whereas during periods the position has not been open the return of the stock has been +27.7%. 
When excluded from the short position early during the sample period (2009 – 2015) the reason 
is mostly the Z-score cutoff and later (2018) the value cutoff. This result indicates that both the 
value and distress risk measures include information on the potential mispricing of Outotec 
during the period, and these indications seem to be correct on average. Regarding Tesla the 
results are not as easy to interpret, since the annual return of the stock when short position have 
been open is 49.1%, whereas it is only 30.0% during times when the position would have been 
closed. This is due to one time period, 2013 – 2014, being highly profitable for Tesla, and the 
short position being open throughout this period. When looking into the returns of Tesla after 
year 2014, the yearly stock return has been 8.0% when the short position has been open and 
26.2% when it has been closed. Whenever Tesla has been excluded from the short position, the 
underlying reason has been the Z-score. This result indicates that the distress risk measure 
includes information of Tesla’s potential mispricing, but there has been times when the 
information has proven to be incorrect. 
The examples above indicate that the short position cutoffs (both value and distress) seem to 
work quite well on average (Outotec during the whole period, Tesla after 2015), but time to 
time short positions in single stocks might suffer heavy losses (Tesla during 2013 – 2014) since 
the information is not by any means perfect. 
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Table 4: Share of value and glamour stocks during 2009 – 2018 
The table below illustrates the share of value and glamour stocks compared to all stocks in the sample. Glamour 
stocks are specified as stocks with P/B figure over 3 and value stocks as stocks with P/B figure below 2. The share 
of stocks is first calculated for each month during 2009 – 2018, and then the relevant statistics are calculated from 
that time series.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Value stocks during 2009 – 2018 divided to distress categories, Share of total 
amount of stocks 
The table below illustrates the share of value stocks divided to five distress risk categories compared to all stocks 
in the sample. Value stocks are specified as stocks with P/B figure below 2. ValND category includes stocks with 
Z-score higher than 5, Val2 Z-score between 3 and 5, Val3 between 2.3 and 3, Val4 between 1.8 and 2.3 and ValD 
below 1.8. The share of stocks is first calculated for each month during 2009 – 2018, and then the relevant statistics 
are calculated from that time series.  
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Table 6: Share of glamour stocks during 2009 – 2018 divided to distress categories, 
Share of total amount of stocks 
The table below illustrates the share of glamour stocks divided to five distress risk categories compared to all 
stocks in the sample. Glamour stocks are specified as stocks with P/B figure above 3. GlamND category includes 
stocks with Z-score higher than 5, Glam2 Z-score between 3 and 5, Glam3 between 2.3 and 3, Glam4 between 1.8 
and 2.3 and GlamD below 1.8. The share of stocks is first calculated for each month during 2009 – 2018, and then 
the relevant statistics are calculated from that time series.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Value stocks during 2009 – 2018 divided to distress categories, Share of total 
amount of value stocks 
The table below illustrates the share of value stocks divided to five distress risk categories compared to all value 
stocks in the sample. Value stocks are specified as stocks with P/B figure below 2. ValND category includes stocks 
with Z-score higher than 5, Val2 Z-score between 3 and 5, Val3 between 2.3 and 3, Val4 between 1.8 and 2.3 and 
ValD below 1.8. The share of stocks is first calculated for each month during 2009 – 2018, and then the relevant 
statistics are calculated from that time series.  
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Table 8: Glamour stocks during 2009 – 2018 divided to distress categories, Share of total 
amount of glamour stocks 
The table below illustrates the share of glamour stocks divided to five distress risk categories compared to all 
glamour stocks in the sample. Glamour stocks are specified as stocks with P/B figure above 3. GlamND category 
includes stocks with Z-score higher than 5, Glam2 Z-score between 3 and 5, Glam3 between 2.3 and 3, Glam4 
between 1.8 and 2.3 and GlamD below 1.8. The share of stocks is first calculated for each month during 2009 – 
2018, and then the relevant statistics are calculated from that time series.  
 
 
 
Table 9: Difference between the share of value stocks and glamour stocks in different 
distress categories during 2009 – 2018 
The table below illustrates the difference between shares of glamour stocks from table 8 and value stocks in table 
7 divided into distress categories. The figures are calculated similarly as in tables 7 and 8, and then deducted from 
each other.  
 
4.2 Methodology 
After cleaning the data, the 388 companies are used to create plain value and Altman Z 
controlled value long/short portfolios, and the 245 companies to create Issuer rating controlled 
value long/short portfolio. For the plain value strategy, the lowest 20 P/B (or highest B/M) 
stocks are chosen in the long portfolio and the highest 20 P/B stocks in the short portfolio at 
each time point so that the companies selected for January portfolio are based on previous 
December figures. This is of course due to the fact that December figures are the latest ones 
available to create a portfolio on January 1st. This 20 company (or around 5%) threshold in the 
plain value portfolio construction is used to be able to choose the same amount of companies 
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in the distress risk eliminated portfolios, and still be able to diminish between value and glamour 
stocks well enough.  
For the distress risk eliminated portfolios, the distress risk is first eliminated in a way that high 
risk stocks are excluded from the long portfolio selection, and only distressed stocks are 
included in the short portfolio selection. After this the same amount of companies from these 
populations are chosen to the non-distressed value long and distressed glamour short portfolios 
as in the plain value and glamour portfolios based on the P/B percentiles. This is due to not 
wanting the results to be affected by more rigorous overall stock selection instead of the distress 
risk cutoffs. For the distress risk cutoffs, highest percentiles of the distress risk figure are not 
utilized at each time point, but instead a constant distress risk cutoff is applied through time. 
This is due to not wanting to give away in the distress risk cutoff when more stocks are 
distressed to capture the possible value creation of rigorous distress risk elimination during 
distressed time periods as well. The paper studies the data to see on what levels of distress risk 
elimination it is still possible to clearly diminish between value and glamour stocks, keeping in 
mind that the Altman Z has to be larger than 3 for the long portfolio and lower than 2.6 for the 
short portfolio. These are considered to be the “Safe” zone and “Grey” zone in the literature  
regarding Altman Z (Altman, 1968, 2000). After this analysis, Z-scores lower than 2.3 are 
included in the short portfolio and higher than 5 in the long portfolio. If these limits are made 
more rigorous, the P/B percentiles start capturing value stocks in the short portfolio and glamour 
stocks in the long portfolio, and that would not be in the scope of this research. As stated in the 
limitation section, the tradeoff between distress risk and value cutoffs is not optimized in this 
paper to avoid overfitting the data. This also means that the portfolio returns could be further 
improved by optimizing the level of distress risk cutoff compared to the value cutoff. However, 
the paper tests the sensitivities of the results by altering these distress risk thresholds. These 
results are discussed in subsection 5.5. Furthermore monthly, quarterly and yearly portfolio 
rebalancing is considered in the research, to see whether shorter or longer holding period creates 
more value to the strategy. 
For the ratings based approach, portfolios with similar rigorousness regarding the P/B figure as 
for the Altman Z based approach are created. This is to keep the two portfolios as comparable 
to each other as possible. By studying the data it seems that the most similar P/B thresholds can 
be achieved with a long portfolio rating boundary of over A+ and a short portfolio boundary of 
under BBB. After this the return of each long and short portfolio is analysed individually. The 
analysis concludes that the Altman Z based long and short portfolios perform very well (low 
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returns for short, high returns for long), whereas the rating based long and short portfolios 
perform quite similarly with each other. Therefore it is not meaningful to conduct further 
analysis regarding the rating based long/short portfolio, since the return of that portfolio seems 
to be around zero. These portfolio returns can be seen in figure 3. Going further, only the 
Altman Z based distress risk elimination is utilized in the analysis. 
As for the plain distress risk factor portfolio, top 20 Altman Z stocks are chosen in the long 
portfolio and bottom 20 in the short portfolio. This is the same amount of stocks as in the plain 
value and distress risk eliminated value portfolios, and the amount is chosen to maintain the 
same level of rigorousness in the overall selection process. 
The return calculation is as follows: First the risk-free rate 𝑟𝑓 is deducted from all the 
EuroStoxx600 company returns 𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑤  as well as from the index return 𝑟𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑤 for every month 𝑡: 
𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡 =  𝑟i,traw − 𝑟𝑓𝑡  
𝑟𝑚,𝑡 =  𝑟m,traw − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 
Then the utilized long, short and long/short portfolios for value (𝑉𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔, 𝑉𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡, 𝑉), distress 
(𝐷𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔, 𝐷𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡, 𝐷) and distress risk eliminated value (𝐷𝑉𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔, 𝐷𝑉𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡, 𝐷𝑉) are created 
as equally weighted portfolios including stocks chosen by the criteria discussed above. Below 
you can see an example of the mathematical formulation of the distress risk eliminated value 
portfolios. The construction is similar for the other portfolios: 
𝐷𝑉𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑟𝑖,𝑡𝐷𝑉𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝐷𝑉𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑟𝑖 ,𝑡𝐷𝑉𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝐷𝑉𝑡 =
𝐷𝑉𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑡 + 𝐷𝑉𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑡
2
 
After this it is possible to compare the long, short and long/short portfolios with each other, 
since all of them are scaled correctly and adjusted with the risk-free return. Going forward the 
linear regression models with autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust covariance matrices  
are created with 𝐹𝐹3, 𝐹𝐹5, 𝐹𝐹3 + 𝑀𝑂𝑀, 𝐹𝐹5 + 𝑀𝑂𝑀, 𝐹𝐹3 + 𝐷 and 𝐹𝐹5 + 𝑀𝑂𝑀 + 𝐷 factor 
portfolios, where 𝐹𝐹3 includes 𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹, 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 portfolios and 𝐹𝐹5 includes 𝑅𝑀𝑊 
and 𝐶𝑀𝐴 portfolios additionally. The 𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹 stands for the market portfolio adjusted with 
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the risk-free rate, 𝑆𝑀𝐵 for the Small-Minus-Big, 𝐻𝑀𝐿 for the High-Minus-Low, 𝑅𝑀𝑊 for the 
Robust-Minus-Weak, 𝐶𝑀𝐴 for the Conservative-Minus-Aggressive, 𝑀𝑂𝑀 for the Momentum 
and 𝐷 for the Distress risk factor portfolios. The documentation for the construction of 𝑆𝑀𝐵, 
𝐻𝑀𝐿, 𝑅𝑀𝑊 and 𝐶𝑀𝐴 portfolios can be found in Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996), for 
𝑀𝑂𝑀 in Carhart (1997) and for 𝑀𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹 and 𝐷 in this paper. The below formula illustrates 
the linear regression model including all the variables of interest as well as the control variables. 
The other models are constructed similarly. 
 𝐷𝑉𝑡 = ∝ +𝛽1(𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡 − 𝑅𝐹𝑡 ) + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
Further we can compare the approach of this paper with Piotroski (2000) and Griffin and 
Lemmon (2002). These studies are considered to be the closest benchmarks to this paper. 
Piotroski (2000) computes his portfolios by first dividing the companies in 9 groups based on 
F-Scores from 1 to 9. He then uses two approaches in his study. First he selects only the highest 
quintile B/M companies in his analysis, and studies whether the returns in different Piotroski F 
categories differ from each other. He notices that the raw returns in the high Piotroski F portfolio 
beats the low portfolio by 7.4% annually. However, he only takes a view on 1- and 2-year 
holding periods for value long portfolios in the US market. He also does not control whether 
these long portfolio returns are explained by any benchmark portfolios, but focuses on the raw 
returns instead. Furthermore he divides the Piotroski F categories into three size buckets each 
and notices that the effect of eliminating the distress risk is the largest within the smallest 
companies. Again he focuses on the raw returns of the long portfolios. What we find similar in 
his approach and the approach utilized in this paper is that the distress risk proxies used are 
constant in time (his groups from Piotroski F are integers between 1 and 9, and this paper’s Z-
scores over 5 or under 2.3). This means that the distress risk proxy does not vary in time based 
on the average distress at each time point. The rest however is different since he focuses on 
long portfolios and raw returns instead of creating long/short portfolios and looking into their 
factor loadings and potential alphas.  
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) on the other hand create their portfolios by dividing the companies 
to 5 categories based on Ohlson’s O (distress) measure. Then they further divide these 
categories into three B/M portfolios each, and calculate long portfolio returns for each of these. 
Again they focus on the long portfolios, which means that they do not observe the value that 
can be added by a short side and creating a long/short portfolio with this strategy. Their study 
shows the mean returns of all portfolios and considers whether the returns are on average higher 
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in the distress risk eliminated value portfolio, but it is not shown whether the volatilities differ 
between the portfolios, and moreover whether making a long/short portfolio would further 
decrease the return volatility. Also their distress risk cutoff is not constant in time, and therefore 
they include more distress risk in their long portfolio during more distressed times, which might 
not be a wanted characteristic. They also regress their long-portfolio returns against the market, 
SMB and HML portfolios, but they do not look into whether it is possible to explain these 
returns with a distress risk factor portfolio. This paper discusses whether the distress risk factor 
portfolio explains the returns of a distress risk eliminated value strategy to monitor whether 
distress risk elimination enhances the returns of the value long/short portfolio more than it 
enhances the market portfolio return. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) also focus on American 
stocks before year 2000, and cover only annual rebalancing of their portfolios.  
Further to make it clear what kind of stocks are chosen in the long and short portfolios of this 
paper: The strategy is long value stocks (high B/M) that are not distressed (high Altman Z or 
rating) and short glamour stocks (low B/M) that are distressed (low Altman Z or rating). This 
means that the strategy is long stocks where their low valuation is not due to high distress risk 
and short stocks where the high valuation is not due to strong financial position. With this 
approach potentially mispriced stocks found in subsection 4.1 are invested in. It is further 
analysed if non-distressed glamour creates a better short leg for the non-distressed value than 
the distressed glamour does. This analysis is covered in subsection 5.1. 
Lastly to shortly summarize the contribution comparing to previous studies: This paper studies 
whether creating a long/short portfolio with distress and value cutoffs outperforms the 
traditional value strategy, whereas previous studies focus on the long portfolios only. The short 
portfolio created includes distressed glamour stocks, and given this the paper also studies 
whether it is possible to find distressed glamour stocks and whether the distressed short leg 
creates more value than non-distressed glamour. Also previously less utilized factor portfolios 
(namely RMW, CMA, MOM and Distress risk factor portfolios) are introduced potentially 
explaining this long/short portfolio return. The overall focus of this paper is more on the risk-
adjusted returns of this strategy instead of the raw returns that have been the focus of the long 
portfolio research earlier. This might create new insights on what is behind the value anomaly 
after the distress risk is eliminated. Furthermore the paper studies whether shorter than one-
year rebalancing creates value for this strategy. Lastly, a new geographic area in Europe is 
introduced instead of dealing with US stocks, as well as a more recent time period of 2009-
2018 is utilized compared to before year 2000. 
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5 RESULTS 
This section first defines the relevant short portfolio for the strategy, after which the raw and 
risk-adjusted returns of the distress risk eliminated value strategy are compared with the plain 
value strategy during 2009 – 2018 with monthly portfolio rebalancing.  Then the section further 
compares the results between 1M, 3M and 12M holding periods and divides the time period to 
two five year periods 2009 – 2013 and 2014 – 2018 and takes a look whether the results seem 
similar between these. Lastly the results with altered value and distress risk cutoffs are studied 
to monitor the robustness of the baseline results, i.e. that the baseline results are not due to 
arbitrary selection of cutoffs. 
The most important results can be divided into three points: 
1. It is possible to find distressed glamour stocks in the market. 
2. These distressed glamour stocks are a better short leg for the non-distressed value 
strategy than non-distressed glamour stocks are. 
3. The performance of the distress risk eliminated value long/short portfolio is high during 
the whole period, even when the traditional factor portfolios don’t perform. 
The first two points show that distress risk is not priced correctly in glamour stocks whereas 
the last point indicates that utilizing this incorrect pricing of distress risk, it is possible to 
outperform the traditional value long/short portfolios. 
5.1 Defining the relevant short portfolio 
There are two main options to create the short side portfolio: either be short non-distressed 
glamour stocks or distressed glamour stocks. Following the mispricing theory of Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) it should be possible to find distressed glamour stocks, which would 
be overpriced in relation to their distress risk. In subsection 4.1 it is found that these distressed 
glamour stocks exist, and the amount of them is similar to the amount of non-distressed value. 
However it might still be that the distress risk is priced correctly in these glamour stocks, and 
therefore it might not create value to be short distressed glamour. Moreover it might be that the 
volatility patterns are similar between non-distressed glamour stocks and non-distressed value 
stocks, and this non-distressed portfolio would then create a better hedge for the non-distressed 
value long portfolio. It might also be that non-distressed glamour stocks are less volatile than 
non-distressed value and distressed glamour, which might lead to distressed glamour being the 
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relevant short leg after all. Given these considerations, this subsection studies whether non-
distressed or distressed glamour seems to be more relevant short leg for non-distressed value. 
 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative returns for the baseline long and short portfolios as well as short 
portfolios including non-distressed glamour stocks 
 
In the figure above we can see the portfolio returns of the baseline long and short portfolios as well as two 
alternative short portfolios including non-distressed glamour stocks. The returns are calculated as being long in 
the long portfolio and short in the short portfolios. The baseline long portfolio includes 20 lowest P/B stocks with  
Z-Score over 5 and the baseline short portfolio 20 highest P/B stocks with Z-score lower than 2.3. Further the 
NonDistressedHigh short portfolio includes 20 highest P/B stocks with Z-score higher than 5, and the 
NonDistressedLow short portfolio 20 highest P/B stocks with Z-score higher than 2.3. These short portfolios 
include either distressed glamour stocks (baseline) or non-distressed glamour stocks with two different 
specifications. All the portfolios are equally weighted and rebalanced monthly.  
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Figure 2: Cumulative returns for the baseline long/short portfolio and long/short 
portfolios including non-distressed glamour stocks in the short leg 
 
In the figure above we can see the portfolio returns of the baseline long/short portfolio as well as two alternative 
long/short portfolios including non-distressed glamour stocks in the short leg. The portfolio used as the long leg 
off all long/short portfolios includes 20 lowest P/B stocks with Z-Score over 5. The baseline short portfolio 
includes 20 highest P/B stocks with Z-score lower than 2.3, the NonDistressedHigh short portfolio 20 highest P/B 
stocks with Z-score higher than 5, and the NonDistressedLow short portfolio 20 highest P/B stocks with Z-score 
higher than 2.3. These short portfolios include either distressed glamour stocks (baseline) or non-distressed 
glamour stocks with two different specifications. The long/short portfolio returns are calculated as being long the 
long portfolio and short each of the short portfolios separately. All the portfolios are equally weighted and 
rebalanced monthly.  
 
Figure 1 above shows the cumulative returns of the long portfolio including non-distressed 
value stocks and the baseline short portfolio including distressed glamour as well as two short 
portfolios including non-distressed glamour with different distress risk cutoffs 
(NonDistressedHigh, Z-score > 5 and NonDistressedLow, Z-score > 2.3). We notice that the 
non-distressed glamour portfolio returns are higher than those of the distressed glamour (in fact 
19.0 – 19.4% vs. 12.5% annually). This indicates that it is possible to find distressed glamour 
stocks that are more mispriced than non-distressed glamour and therefore the distressed 
glamour could create a more relevant short leg for this strategy. Furthermore the correlation 
between the non-distressed value and distressed glamour short portfolio is -0.76, when it is only 
-0.68 between the non-distressed value and non-distressed glamour portfolios. This is quite 
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surprising but it might be due to distressed stocks and value stocks in general moving similarly, 
which means that it might be better to include value in the long leg and distress in the short leg 
than to include value in the long leg and no distress in the short leg. Also the volatilities are 
closer to each other with the distressed short leg than with the non-distressed ones (long 
volatility 17.5%, distressed short 13%, non-distressed 12.3%). This is not surprising since Fama 
and French (1993) find that value stocks have higher volatility than glamour stocks and Malik 
and Aftab (2013) find that distressed stocks are more volatile than non-distressed. All of these 
results imply that the distressed glamour would be a more suitable short leg for non-distressed 
value. 
Figure 2 shows the long/short portfolio returns for portfolios that are long non-distressed value  
and short either distressed (Baseline) or non-distressed (NonDistressed) glamour stocks. Here 
we see that the returns are both higher (6.0% vs. 2.5 – 2.7% annually) and more stable (5.7% 
vs. 6.3% volatility) when shorting the distressed glamour. This result is due to the returns, 
volatilities and correlations discussed in previous chapter and they imply that the distressed 
glamour creates a better short leg for non-distressed value than non-distressed glamour does. 
This is likely due to more mispricing in distressed glamour compared to non-distressed as well 
as plain value and plain distressed stock returns being similar to some extent. With these 
analyses the distressed glamour is chosen to be the short leg of the strategy. 
5.2 Base case distress risk eliminated value and plain value comparison 
In this subsection the long and short portfolio returns of plain value, value with rating cutoffs 
and value with Altman Z cutoffs are compared individually with each other.  In figure 3 we can 
see the cumulative returns of these long and short portfolios. We notice from the long side that 
the cumulative returns of the Altman Z value portfolio and the plain value portfolio are similar 
in scale. We can also note that the returns of the Altman Z value long portfolio are a bit more 
stable than the ones of the plain value long portfolio. The clearest this can be noticed during 
years 2015 – 2016, where there is a clear dip in the plain value long portfolio returns, similar 
which cannot be observed in the Altman Z value portfolio. Furthermore we can see the 
difference when looking into the mean returns and standard deviations of these portfolios. The 
Z-Score value long portfolio mean return is 24.5% and its volatility is 17.5% whereas the same 
figures for the plain value long portfolio are 26% and 22.1%. We also notice that the rating 
value long portfolio returns are low (14.4% annually) compared to the other long portfolios, 
and therefore it seems that eliminating distress based on rating doesn’t seem to capture the same 
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value as eliminating based on Altman Z does. This might be due to rating taking more of a view  
to the collateral values of a company rather than to the continuity of the business. This could 
mean rating elimination filtering in companies with low operating profitability.  
From the short side we notice that the plain value short portfolio seems to be the worst option 
to choose as the short portfolio, since it is in fact able to create high returns comparing to other 
short portfolios (19.1% annually compared to 11.6% – 12.5% in the distress risk eliminated 
portfolios). This might be due to plain value shorting valuable companies with good business 
strategies that are worth their high valuation. On the other hand, the short side of the rating and 
Z-score value portfolios seem to perform quite equally (rating 11.6% and Z-score 12.5% mean 
returns and 12.7% and 13.0% volatilities). Therefore it seems that the rating elimination is able 
to collect the high distress risk glamour stocks in the short portfolio, whereas it might not work 
at choosing the low distress risk value stocks in the long side.  
Going into the long/short portfolios (cumulative returns are illustrated in figure 4), it does not 
seem meaningful to keep on analysing the rating long/short portfolio returns, since the return 
of this portfolio is around zero. The rating based value long/short portfolio annualized mean 
return is 1.4% and the cumulative 10Y return is 10.3% which seems to be merely fluctuation 
around zero than continuous positive return. However, one thing to note here is that the rating 
based distress measure might create a good short portfolio for some strategy going forward, 
since as stated it provides similar results as the Z-score short portfolio. For the Altman Z 
portfolio, it seems that the distress risk elimination is able to add most value in the short 
portfolio selection noticing the lower returns of the Altman Z short portfolio comparing with 
the plain value short portfolio (12.5% vs. 19.1% annually). It also seems that the Altman Z long 
portfolio is able to enhance the value strategy by decreasing the volatility of the long side return 
(17.5% vs. 22.1% annually).  
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Figure 3: Cumulative returns of value strategy long and short portfolios  
 
In the figure above we can see the long and short portfolio returns individually for the plain value as well as the 
distress risk eliminated portfolios with both Altman Z and rating cutoffs. The returns are calculated as being long 
in the long portfolios and short in the short portfolios. The plain value long portfolio includes lowest 20 P/B stocks 
and the short portfolio highest 20 P/B stocks. Similarly Rating and Z-Score long portfolios include 20 lowest P/B 
stocks with either Z-Score over 5 or Rating better than A+ and the short portfolios include 20 highest P/B stocks 
with either Z-score lower than 2.3 or rating lower than BBB. All the portfolios are equally weighted and rebalanced 
monthly.  
 
The Sharpe ratios in Table 10 are calculated as being long in all of the individual portfolios. 
Looking into the Sharpe ratios for plain value, Altman Z value and rating value long and short 
portfolios shows us that the Z-score value long portfolio creates the highest Sharpe ratio (1.39 
vs. second highest plain value long at 1.18). We can also see that the rating and Altman Z short 
portfolios perform quite equally when comparing with the Sharpe ratios (0.91 and 0.96). 
Furthermore the rating long portfolio provides the lowest Sharpe ratio (0.57), and therefore it 
seems that it is not meaningful to keep on analysing the long/short value portfolio with rating 
cutoffs. Lastly, the plain value short portfolio Sharpe ratio is high at least considering it to be 
used as a short portfolio (1.09 vs. 1.18 for the similar long portfolio). 
These information indicate that the Altman Z cutoffs are able to create value for both the long 
and short portfolios, whereas the rating short portfolio could add value that the rating long 
portfolio would then destroy. The higher Sharpe ratio in the Altman Z long portfolio comparing 
to the plain value long portfolio is due to lower volatility (17.5% vs. 22.1%), whereas the 
Altman Z and rating short portfolio lower Sharpe ratios compared to the plain value short 
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portfolio seem to be due to lower mean returns (11.6% and 12.5% vs. 19.1%). Lastly in these 
results we see that the plain value short portfolio seems to be quite a poor option as a short 
portfolio, since it is able to provide quite high Sharpe ratios (1.09) and returns (19.1% annually). 
 
Table 10: Sharpe ratios for value strategy long and short portfolios  
In the table below we can see the Sharpe ratios of plain value long and short portfolios as well as long and short 
value portfolios with Altman Z and Rating cutoffs when taking long positions in all of these portfolios 
individually. The portfolio selection is similar as described in figure 3 explanation.  
 
 
Figure 4 below illustrates the cumulative returns of the distress risk eliminated value long/short 
portfolios and a few chosen benchmark portfolios. These portfolios are plain value, Mkt-RF, 
SMB and HML respectively. All the other portfolios are long/short but Mkt-RF is long only. 
We can see that on a time period from 1/2009 to 12/2018 the returns of the distress risk (Z-
score) eliminated long/short portfolio (6.0% annually) are second highest within this group of 
portfolios only second to the Mkt-RF long portfolio (9.4%). However, the Mkt-RF portfolio 
would have a more meaningful comparison against the long portfolios in figure 3, where we 
can see that all value long portfolios are able to beat the market portfolio. Further in figure 4 
we can see that the return of the Altman Z value portfolio is very stable (5.7% annualized 
volatility), and persists all the way to the end of 2018 (5.5% annual return during 2014 – 2018). 
When comparing with the closest benchmarks, namely SMB and plain value portfolios, we can 
see that the volatility of these benchmarks is considerably higher (around 9% annually) and in 
fact from 2017 onwards both the SMB and plain value portfolio returns have decreased whereas 
the distress risk eliminated value portfolio keeps performing well (annualized mean return 4.2% 
vs. -3% for value and 0% for SMB after 2017). Therefore it seems that the plain value anomaly 
might be fading away, but with distress risk elimination the anomaly can still be found. 
However the time period we monitor here is too short to determine whether the plain value 
anomaly is really fading or whether this is just some time varying change we see. Moreover we 
notice that the rating value long/short portfolio cumulative returns are very low for the whole 
period (1.4% annually), merely fluctuating around zero. 
In table 11 we observe the Sharpe ratios of the Altman Z value portfolio and the same 
benchmark portfolios as earlier, namely plain value, Mkt-RF, SMB and HML. We can see that 
the annualized Sharpe ratio of the Altman Z value portfolio is the highest within the group 
Rating/Long Rating/Short Z-score/Long Z-score/Short Value/Long Value/Short
Sharpe ratio 0.57 0.91 1.39 0.96 1.18 1.09
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(1.09) followed by the market portfolio (0.7) and SMB (0.57). Furthermore we can see that the 
Sharpe ratio of the plain value long/short portfolio is only 0.39, and therefore it seems that the 
distress risk elimination enhances the value strategy in our sample.  
 
Figure 4: Time series of cumulative returns for distress risk eliminated value strategy 
(Value/Altman and Value/Rating) and chosen benchmark portfolios  
 
In the above figure one can see the time series of cumulative returns for distress risk eliminated value long/short 
portfolios (Value/Altman and Value/Rating) as well as chosen benchmark portfolios. The benchmark portfolios 
are the European Small-Minus-Big portfolio return (SMB), the European High-Minus-Low portfolio return (HML) 
from Kenneth French data library, and the European market portfolio return in excess of the risk-free return (Mkt-
rf) as well as a value investing strategy without distress risk elimination (Value) from the EuroStoxx600 data. The 
time period is from 01/2009 to 12/2018. The market portfolio is  a value weighted long portfolio of EuroStoxx600 
stocks and the plain value portfolio is  an equally weighted long/short portfolio long 20 lowest P/B stocks and short 
20 highest P/B stocks with monthly rebalancing. SMB and HML portfolios are computed similarly as documented 
in Fama and French (1993).  
 
 
Table 11: Sharpe ratios of distress risk eliminated value strategy (Value/Altman) and 
chosen benchmark portfolios  
The table below represents the annualized Sharpe ratios of the distress risk eliminated value strategy portfolio 
(Altman Z) and chosen benchmark portfolios. These are the same port folios as specified above in figure 4 
excluding the rating portfolio since it does not seem to yield returns different from zero.  
 
 
In figure 5 below we see the cumulative returns of the long, short and long/short plain distress 
risk portfolios where the distress risk is proxied by Altman Z. Top 20 Altman Z companies are 
chosen in the long portfolio and bottom 20 in the short portfolio each month. In the figure we 
Value/Altman Value Mkt-rf SMB HML
Sharpe ratio 1.06 0.39 0.70 0.53 -0.17
32 
 
can see that the scale of the returns on long and short portfolios are similar (21.7% and 20.6%), 
and that the long/short portfolio returns are close to zero (0.5% annually) for the whole period. 
Therefore a distress risk anomaly does not seem to appear implying that distress risk is on 
average priced correctly in stocks. However we can see that the volatility patterns of the long 
and short portfolios are not similar, and that the volatility of the short side portfolio is in fact 
larger (in fact the volatilities are 12.8% for the long portfolio and 17.2% for the short portfolio). 
This means that the distress risk long/short factor portfolio might reveal loadings to distressed 
stocks after all. Furthermore the result implies that distress risk elimination might decrease 
return volatilities, which we saw already in figure 3 in distress risk eliminated value long 
portfolio return. Therefore it is meaningful to add this distress risk factor portfolio in the 
regressions explaining the dependent portfolio returns. 
 
Figure 5: Cumulative returns of plain distress risk long, short and long/short portfolios, 
distress risk proxied by Altman Z 
 
In the figure above we can see the cumulative returns of the long, short and long/short plain distress risk portfolios 
for 2009 - 2018. The long portfolio invests in 20 highest Altman Z stocks, and short portfolio in lowest 20 Altman 
Z stocks. The long/short portfolio includes both of these legs. All the portfolios are equally weighted and 
rebalanced monthly.   
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Table 12 summarizes the OLS regression results of the distress risk eliminated value long/short 
portfolio, where the distress risk is proxied with Altman Z. The factor portfolios utilized are 
Mkt-RF, SMB, HML, MOM, RMW, CMA and the Distress risk factor portfolio. We can see 
that the adjusted R-squared is between 17% and 24% depending on the model, and the portfolio 
loads mostly on the SMB and Mkt-RF portfolios. Furthermore we can see that the HML loading 
is insignificant and that the Distress risk factor loading is positive, meaning that there are less 
distressed companies in the long portfolio compared to the short side. Lastly we notice that the 
alpha is significant and around 4-5% annually. 
The significant alpha suggests that the distress risk elimination might enhance the value strategy 
beyond what the distress risk factor portfolio is able to explain. The insignificant loading on the 
HML factor is a bit surprising since the portfolio selection is partly based on the B/M figure 
behind the HML portfolio as well. Furthermore the loadings on SMB and HML portfolios 
suggest that the portfolio return is rather explained by the size factor than the value factor. This 
implies that it is easier to find small companies that are undervalued than large companies with 
low valuations. This sounds intuitive and is in line with Vassalou and Xing (2004). Furthermore 
the positive loading on the market factor implies higher betas in the long portfolio compared to 
the short, which is in line with Petkova and Zhang (2005). 
Overall it seems that the distress risk exposure is unable to explain all of the value anomaly, 
and that the distress risk elimination seems to enhance the value strategy. This contradicts with 
the risk-factor theory of Fama and French (1993) and supports mispricing theory of Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994). Furthermore this result suggests that it is possible to yield value 
strategy returns without including excess distress risk in the portfolio. 
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Table 12: Results for the linear regressions explaining the return of the distress risk 
eliminated long/short value portfolio, distress  risk proxied by Altman Z  
The table below contains the OLS regression results explaining the returns of the distress risk eliminated long/short 
value portfolio during 2009 – 2018. The portfolio is formed from EuroStoxx600 as long positions in lowest 20 
P/B stocks with Altman Z-score higher than 5 and short positions in highest 20 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score 
lower than 2.3. The portfolio is equally weighted and rebalanced monthly. Market portfolio is the value weighted 
EuroStoxx600 long portfolio, risk-free return is the US Treasury one-month yield and the Distress risk factor 
portfolio is conducted by choosing long 20 highest Altman Z stocks and short 20 lowest Altman Z stocks from the 
EuroStoxx600 weighting the portfolio equally and rebalancing monthly. Excluding the market portfolio the FF5 
factor portfolios are the European factor portfolios from Kenneth French data library. Moreover as the distress risk 
factor portfolio is constructed as long positions in non-distressed stocks and short positions in distressed stocks, 
positive loading implies  exposure towards non-distressed stocks and negative loading exposure to distressed 
stocks. 
 
 
The standard errors used in the t-stat calculations are autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust. Furthermore 
*** means that the result is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Independent
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3.91** 4.91*** 4.28** 4.78** 4.03** 4.66**
(2.348) (2.763) (2.028) (2.258) (2.364) (2.263)
Mkt-RF 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.09** 0.09* 0.14*** 0.09**
(3.513) (2.668) (2.113) (1.904) (3.635) (2.02)
SMB 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.22**
(3.599) (3.287) (2.996) (2.862) (3.219) (2.573)
HML 0.09 0.02 0.22 0.15 0.16** 0.24*
(1.515) (0.334) (1.539) (1.067) (2.11) (1.734)
MOM -0.1** -0.07 -0.09*
(-2.283) (-1.657) (-1.934)
RMW 0.04 0.05 0.11
(0.202) (0.233) (0.5)
CMA -0.35** -0.25 -0.21
(-2.141) (-1.59) (-1.336)
Distress 0.16 0.2*
(1.467) (1.906)
no. of obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120
Adjusted 16.9% 20.5% 20.2% 21.1% 18.5% 23.8%
Dependent variable:
Return of the distress risk controlled long/short value portfolio
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In table 13 we can see the OLS regression results where the Mkt-RF, SMB, HML, MOM, 
RMW, CMA and Distress risk factor portfolios explain the return of the plain value portfolio. 
Here the adjusted R-squared is between 40% and 65%, which is considerably higher than for 
the distress risk eliminated portfolio. Furthermore we can see that the alphas are significant in 
only the models including the Momentum factor where the MOM factor loading is significantly 
negative. However, the alphas are still positive in all the models, between 1.2% and 5.5%. We 
can also see that the SMB factor is still mostly significant, but so is the HML factor which 
seems to be the largest positive driver of this plain value return. Moreover we can see that the 
Distress risk factor loading is now negative which means that the portfolio loads on distressed 
stocks. 
These results suggest that the HML and SMB factors are able to capture almost all of the return 
of this plain value portfolio. The HML factor seems to be the largest positive driver of the 
portfolio return, which is not surprising since the B/M figure is the basis in constructing both  
of these portfolios. Furthermore the plain value strategy seems to invest in the momentum 
strategy inversely. This again is in line with Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008). It also seems that the market betas are on average higher in the 
long portfolio comparing to the short portfolio, which is also found by Petkova and Zhang 
(2005). Moreover it seems that the value strategy includes more distress risk in the long 
portfolio in comparison with the short portfolio. This is in line with Fama and French (1993) 
risk-based explanation for the value anomaly. Lastly, the factor portfolios explain up to 65% of 
the value long/short portfolio return which can be considered quite high especially when 
comparing with the distress risk eliminated value portfolio R-squared around 20%. 
Overall these results support the risk factor theory by Fama and French (1993) at least to some 
extent; the value strategy long portfolio includes more distressed stocks than the short portfolio, 
which might justify the high returns of the value strategy. 
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Table 13: Results for the linear regressions explaining the return of the plain value 
long/short portfolio 
The below table contains the linear regression results explaining the returns of the plain value long/short portfolio 
during 2009 – 2018. The portfolio is formed from EuroStoxx600 as long positions in lowest 20 P/B stocks and 
short positions in highest 20 P/B stocks. The portfolio is equally weighted and rebalanced monthly. Market 
portfolio is the value weighted EuroStoxx600 long portfolio, risk-free return is the US Treasury one-month bill 
yield and the Distress risk factor portfolio is conducted by choosing long 20 highest Altman Z stocks and short 20 
lowest Altman Z stocks from the EuroStoxx600 weighting the portfolio equally and rebalancing monthly. 
Excluding the market portfolio the FF5 factor portfolios are the European portfolios from Kenneth French data 
library. Moreover as the distress risk factor portfolio is constructed as long positions in non-distressed stocks and 
short positions in distressed stocks, positive loading implies exposure towards non-distressed stocks and negative 
loading exposure to distressed stocks. 
 
 
The standard errors used in the t-stat calculations are autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust. Furthermore 
*** means that the result is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
  
Independent
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.18 5.54*** 1.21 3.78** 2.06 3.78**
(0.954) (2.868) (0.541) (2.149) (0.947) (2.252)
Mkt-RF 0.16* 0.06 0.11* 0.07* 0.16* 0.07*
(1.871) (1.373) (1.869) (1.836) (1.9) (1.78)
SMB 0.23* 0.12 0.21* 0.18** 0.27** 0.2**
(1.684) (1.305) (1.79) (2.012) (2.061) (2.273)
HML 0.56*** 0.32*** 0.87*** 0.47*** 0.44*** 0.4***
(7.074) (4.773) (4.237) (4.451) (4.36) (3.534)
MOM -0.36*** -0.38*** -0.37***
(-6.867) (-7.773) (-7.395)
RMW 0.34 0.37** 0.33**
(1.508) (2.424) (2.15)
CMA -0.42 0.14 0.12
(-1.448) (0.914) (0.769)
Distress -0.29** -0.14
(-2.123) (-1.511)
no. of obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120
Adjusted 41.6% 61.5% 44.7% 62.5% 43.9% 62.9%
Dependent variable:
Return of the plain long/short value portfolio
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When comparing the results of the distress risk eliminated value and plain value strategies we 
notice that both strategies load on the market and size factors positively with similar scale. 
These results suggest that the value strategy invests in high market beta small companies, 
whereas it tends to be short larger companies with lower market betas. These findings are in 
line with Petkova and Zhang (2005) and Vassalou and Xing (2004). Moreover the CMA and 
RMW factors don’t seem to explain the portfolio returns in either case. 
Looking into the differences between plain value and distress risk eliminated value it seems 
that the plain value strategy loads more negatively on the momentum factor which means that 
it seems to choose momentum short stocks in the long portfolio and vice versa, whereas this 
phenomenon is less significant in the distress risk eliminated portfolio. Also, in line with Fama 
and French (1993), the plain value long/short portfolio seems to invest in distressed companies 
which is indicated by the Distress risk factor portfolio loading. However in contradiction with 
Fama and French (1993) and in line with Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) the distress 
risk eliminated value strategy is still able to produce high returns without the elevated distress 
risk exposure. This is indicated by the Distress risk factor portfolio loadings and the significant 
positive alphas (4-5% annually) as well as the raw return (6% annually) of the distress risk 
eliminated value long/short portfolio. It also seems that the chosen traditional factor portfolios 
are able to explain the returns of the plain value portfolio quite well, whereas they fail in 
explaining the distress risk eliminated value portfolio returns. This is implied by the adjusted 
R-squared of up to 65% with the plain value portfolio and only around 20% with the distress 
risk eliminated value portfolio. 
5.3 Distress risk eliminated value strategy with longer holding periods 
The distress risk measures mostly vary either quarterly or yearly depending on the reporting 
intervals of the company. This makes it so that with holding periods shorter than 3M (or 12M 
in some cases), the distress risk indicators don’t usually change. However, the value measure 
(B/M or P/B) varies in relation to the market value of the stock, which means that there might 
be differences in the portfolio selection between rebalancing the portfolio monthly, quarterly 
or yearly. This subsection studies whether the results discussed in the above chapters look 
similar with different holding periods. Below figures and tables compare results between 1M 
(baseline), 3M and 12M holding periods. This analysis adds value to the previous studies where 
the rebalancing has been done annually (Friewald, Wagner and Zechner, 2014, Griffin and 
Lemmon, 2002 and Piotroski, 2000 to name a few). 
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Figure 6: Cumulative returns of distress risk eliminated value long and short portfolios 
with holding periods of 1M, 3M and 12M  
 
In the above figure one can see the time series of cumulative returns for distress risk eliminated value long and 
short portfolios with holding periods of 1M, 3M and 12M. The time period is from 01/2009 to 12/2018. The returns 
are calculated as being long in the long portfolios and short in the short portfolios. The long portfolios include 20 
lowest P/B stocks with Z-Score over 5 and the short portfolios include 20 highest P/B stocks with Z-score lower 
than 2.3. The portfolios are equally weighted and rebalanced either monthly, quarterly or annually.  
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Sharpe ratios of distress risk eliminated value long and short portfolios with 
holding periods of 1M, 3M and 12M 
The table below represents the annualized Sharpe ratios of distress risk eliminated value long and short portfolios 
with holding periods of 1M, 3M and 12M. The time period is from 01/2009 to 12/2018. The Sharpe ratios are 
calculated as taking long positions in all of these portfolios individually. The portfolio selection is similar as 
described in figure 6 explanation.  
 
 
 
 
  
Long1M Short1M Long3M Short3M Long12M Short12M
Sharpe ratio 1.39 0.96 1.35 1.02 1.36 1.07
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Figure 7: Cumulative returns of distress risk eliminated value long/short portfolios with 
holding periods of 1M, 3M and 12M 
 
In the above figure one can see the time series of cumulative returns for distress risk eliminated value long/short 
portfolios with holding periods of 1M, 3M and 12M. The time period is from 01/2009 to 12/2018. The long 
portfolios include 20 lowest P/B stocks with Z-Score over 5 and the short portfolios include 20 highest P/B stocks 
with Z-score lower than 2.3. The long/short portfolio includes both of these legs. The portfolios are equally 
weighted and rebalanced either monthly, quarterly or annually.  
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Sharpe ratios of distress risk eliminated value long/short portfolios with 
holding periods of 1M, 3M and 12M 
The table below represents the annualized Sharpe ratios of distress risk eliminated long/short portfolios with 
holding periods of 1M, 3M and 12M. The time period is from 01/2009 to 12/2018. The portfolio selection is similar 
as described in figure 7 explanation. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
LongShort1M LongShort3M LongShort12M
Sharpe ratio 1.06 0.92 0.77
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Table 16: Results of the linear regressions explaining the return of the distress risk 
eliminated value long/short portfolio with 3M holding period 
The below table contains the linear regression results explaining the returns of the distress risk eliminated value 
long/short portfolio with 3-month holding periods during 2009 – 2018. The portfolio is formed from EuroStoxx600 
as long positions in lowest 20 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score higher than 5 and short positions in highest 20 P/B 
stocks with Altman Z-score lower than 2.3. The portfolio is equally weighted and rebalanced quarterly. Market 
portfolio is the value weighted EuroStoxx600 long portfolio, risk-free return is the US Treasury one-month yield 
and the Distress risk factor portfolio is conducted by choosing long 20 highest Altman Z stocks and short 20 lowest 
Altman Z stocks from the EuroStoxx600 weighting the portfolio equally and rebalancing monthly. Excluding the 
market portfolio the FF5 factor portfolios are the European factor portfolios from Kenneth French data library. 
Moreover as the distress risk factor portfolio is constructed as long positions in non-distressed stocks and short 
positions in distressed stocks, positive loading implies exposure towards non-distressed stocks and negative 
loading exposure to distressed stocks. 
 
 
The standard errors used in the t-stat calculations are autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust. Furthermore 
*** means that the result is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
 
 
  
Independent
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3.29* 4.16** 3.66* 4.03* 3.29* 3.91*
(1.911) (2.372) (1.693) (1.902) (1.899) (1.846)
Mkt-RF 0.13*** 0.1** 0.08* 0.08* 0.14*** 0.09**
(3.232) (2.525) (1.921) (1.733) (3.473) (2.032)
SMB 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.23***
(3.927) (3.74) (3.337) (3.214) (3.45) (2.95)
HML 0.11* 0.04 0.23 0.16 0.19*** 0.26*
(1.762) (0.689) (1.574) (1.165) (2.761) (1.863)
MOM -0.1** -0.06 -0.08*
(-2.11) (-1.51) (-1.968)
RMW 0.03 0.04 0.1
(0.132) (0.157) (0.434)
CMA -0.34** -0.25* -0.2
(-2.187) (-1.746) (-1.307)
Distress 0.21** 0.24**
(2.072) (2.298)
no. of obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120
Adjusted 19.3% 22.8% 23.5% 24.7% 23.1% 29.1%
Dependent variable:
Return of the distress risk controlled long/short value portfolio, 3M holding period
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Table 17: Results for the linear regressions explaining the return of the distress risk 
eliminated value long/short portfolio with 12M holding period 
The below table contains the linear regression results explaining the returns of the distress risk eliminated value 
long/short portfolio with 12-month holding periods during 2009 – 2018. The portfolio is formed from 
EuroStoxx600 as long positions in lowest 20 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score higher than 5 and short positions in 
highest 20 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score lower than 2.3. The portfolio is equally weighted and rebalanced 
annually. Market portfolio is the value weighted EuroStoxx600 long portfolio, risk-free return is the US Treasury 
one-month yield and the Distress risk factor portfolio is conducted by choosing long 20 highest Altman Z stocks 
and short 20 lowest Altman Z stocks from the EuroStoxx600 weighting the portfolio equally and rebalancing 
monthly. Excluding the market portfolio the FF5 factor portfolios are the European factor portfolios from Kenneth 
French data library. Moreover as the distress risk factor portfolio is constructed as long positions in non-distressed 
stocks and short positions in distressed stocks, positive loading implies exposure towards non-distressed stocks 
and negative loading exposure to distressed stocks. 
 
 
The standard errors used in the t-stat calculations are autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust. Furthermore 
*** means that the result is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.   
 
 
  
Independent
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.67 4.03** 2.67 3.41* 2.67 3.29*
(1.503) (2.171) (1.257) (1.682) (1.612) (1.747)
Mkt-RF 0.13** 0.09* 0.09* 0.08* 0.15** 0.1**
(2.135) (1.978) (1.858) (1.725) (2.476) (2.477)
SMB 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.29***
(3.864) (4.019) (3.861) (3.849) (3.278) (3.596)
HML 0.12* 0.03 0.29* 0.15 0.24*** 0.29**
(1.879) (0.393) (1.678) (1.013) (3.671) (2.279)
MOM -0.14** -0.13** -0.16***
(-2.367) (-2.153) (-2.958)
RMW 0.12 0.13 0.21
(0.541) (0.623) (1.121)
CMA -0.31 -0.13 -0.07
(-1.47) (-0.707) (-0.45)
Distress 0.42*** 0.48***
(3.702) (4.992)
no. of obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120
Adjusted 17.2% 23.1% 19.2% 22.6% 27.6% 36.2%
Dependent variable:
Return of the distress risk controlled long/short value portfolio, 12M holding period
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In figure 6 and table 14 we can see that the raw returns and Sharpe ratios are the highest in the 
1M holding period long portfolio (24.5% annual return, 1.39 Sharpe ratio) and the lowest in the 
1M holding period short portfolio (12.5% annual return, 0.95 Sharpe ratio). These results imply 
that the 1-month rebalancing adds value to the distress risk eliminated value strategy comparing 
to longer holding periods and that this outperformance comes from both the long and short 
portfolios. Results in figure 7 and table 15 further argue in favour of this interpretation, since 
the returns are the highest and most stable with the 1-month holding period long/short portfolio 
(6.0% return and 5.7% volatility annually). Also the Sharpe ratio of this portfolio is the highest 
within the calculated long/short portfolios with different holding periods (1.06). 
Furthermore comparing tables 16 and 17 with table 12 shows us that the alphas decrease from 
significant 4 - 5% with 1M holding period to mostly insignificant 2.5 - 4% with 12M holding 
period. Furthermore it looks that the distress risk factor loading increases with the holding 
period (0.2 with 1M vs. 0.5 with 12M), as do the loadings to SMB, HML and MOM, whereas 
the market factor loading remains the same. Also the R-squared increases from around 20% 
with 1M holding period to as high as 37% with the 12M holding period. However, regarding 
the alphas a similar decrease in the plain value portfolio is found when rebalancing the portfolio 
only quarterly or annually. These plain value portfolio alphas are zero. The plain value 
regression results are not reported in my thesis, since they are not in the scope of the study. 
All in all it seems that the 1-month holding period provides the highest and most stable raw 
returns (6% vs. 5% returns), as well as the highest risk-adjusted returns (4 - 5% alphas compared 
to 2.6 – 4%). This might be due to faster reaction to either new accounting information or new 
value indications from the market. Furthermore it seems that the longer the holding period is, 
the more the returns are explained by the factor portfolios, namely SMB, HML and MOM. This 
might be due to getting less value from reacting slower to distress risk indications, and therefore 
loading more on the traditional factors. Lastly, it seems that the outperformance of the 1M 
holding period comes from both long and short side portfolios. 
5.4 Distress risk eliminated value strategy development in time 
When looking at figure 4 it seems that the returns of the distress risk eliminated value long/short 
portfolio have been even more stable during the last years of the sample period comparing to 
the first years and especially comparing with the nearest benchmark (SMB and plain value) 
portfolio returns. Looking into the late performance we notice that the returns of the distress 
risk eliminated value long/short portfolio are still 4.2% annually during 2017 and 2018, whereas 
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SMB and plain value returns are 0% and -3% during the same period.  Given this decrease of 
returns in the traditional factor portfolios, this section studies whether the raw returns and factor 
loadings of the distress risk eliminated value portfolio look similar during the first five years 
(2009 – 2013) and the last five years (2014 – 2018) of the observation period. Below figures 
and tables compare the results between the first and last five years of the sample period. 
 
Figure 8: Cumulative returns of distress risk eliminated value long, short and long/short 
portfolios during 2009 – 2013 and 2014 - 2018 
 
In the above figure one can see the time series of cumulative returns for distress risk eliminated value long, short 
and long/short portfolios during 2009 – 2013 (Early) and 2014 – 2018 (Late) separately. The returns are calculated 
as being long in the long portfolios and short in the short portfolios. The long portfolios include 20 lowest P/B 
stocks with Z-Score over 5 and the short portfolios include 20 highest P/B stocks with Z-score lower than 2.3. The 
long/short portfolios include both of these legs. All of the portfolios are equally weighted and rebalanced monthly.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18: Sharpe ratios of distress risk eliminated value long, short and long/short 
portfolios during 2009 – 2013 and 2014 – 2018 
The table below represents the annualized Sharpe ratios of distress risk eliminated value long, short and long/short 
portfolios during 2009 – 2013 (Early) and 2014 – 2018 (Late) separately. The portfolio selection is similar as 
described in figure 8 explanation. 
 
  
LongEarly ShortEarly LongLate ShortLate LongShortEarly LongShortLate
Sharpe ratio 1.63 1.51 1.05 0.38 0.95 1.09
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Table 19: Results for the linear regressions explaining the return of the distress risk 
eliminated value portfolio during 2009 – 2013 
The below table contains the linear regression results explaining the returns of the distress risk eliminated 
long/short value portfolio during 2009 – 2013. The portfolio is formed from EuroStoxx600 as long positions in 
lowest 20 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score higher than 5 and short positions in highest 20 P/B stocks with Altman 
Z-score lower than 2.3. The portfolio is equally weighted and rebalanced monthly. Market portfolio is the value 
weighted EuroStoxx600 long portfolio, risk-free return is the US Treasury one-month yield and the Distress risk 
factor portfolio is conducted by choosing long 20 highest Altman Z stocks and short 20 lowest Altman Z stocks 
from the EuroStoxx600 weighting the portfolio equally and rebalancing monthly. Excluding the market portfolio 
the FF5 factor portfolios are the European factor portfolios from Kenneth French data library. Moreover as the 
distress risk factor portfolio is constructed as long positions in non-distressed stocks and short positions in 
distressed stocks, positive loading implies exposure towards non-distressed stocks and negative loading exposure 
to distressed stocks. 
 
 
The standard errors used in the t-stat calculations are autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust. Furthermore 
*** means that the result is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
 
 
  
Independent
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1.45 2.67** 1.09 1.33* 1.69 1.57
(0.426) (2.171) (1.257) (1.682) (0.567) (0.426)
Mkt-RF 0.24*** 0.21*** 0.18** 0.18** 0.26*** 0.19**
(4.307) (3.213) (2.28) (2.21) (4.381) (2.272)
SMB 0.4*** 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.36***
(3.641) (3.006) (3.299) (3.094) (3.524) (3.003)
HML -0.02 -0.09 0.22 0.16 0.08 0.29
(-0.312) (-1.042) (1.099) (0.826) (0.817) (1.575)
MOM -0.09* -0.05 -0.07
(-1.739) (-1.069) (-1.269)
RMW 0.23 0.24 0.27
(0.668) (0.719) (0.864)
CMA -0.38 -0.28 -0.28
(-1.52) (-1.071) (-1.081)
Distress 0.24 0.3*
(1.353) (1.784)
no. of obs. 60 60 60 60 60 60
Adjusted 22.4% 24.9% 26.5% 26.0% 23.7% 29.0%
Dependent variable:
Return of the distress risk controlled long/short value portfolio, first 5Y in sample
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Table 20: Results for the linear regressions explaining the return of the distress risk 
eliminated value portfolio during 2014 – 2018 
The below table contains the linear regression results explaining the returns of the distress risk eliminated 
long/short value portfolio during 2014 – 2018. The portfolio is formed from EuroStoxx600 as long positions in 
lowest 20 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score higher than 5 and short positions in highest 20 P/B stocks with Altman 
Z-score lower than 2.3. The portfolio is equally weighted and rebalanced monthly. Market portfolio is the value 
weighted EuroStoxx600 long portfolio, risk-free return is the US Treasury one-month yield and the Distress risk 
portfolio is conducted by choosing long 20 highest Altman Z stocks and short 20 lowest Altman Z stocks from the 
EuroStoxx600 weighting the portfolio equally and rebalancing monthly. Excluding the market portfolio the FF5 
factor portfolios are the European factor portfolios from Kenneth French data library. Moreover as the distress risk 
factor portfolio is constructed as long positions in non-distressed stocks and short positions in distressed stocks, 
positive loading implies exposure towards non-distressed stocks and negative loading exposure to distressed 
stocks. 
 
 
The standard errors used in the t-stat calculations are autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust. Furthermore 
*** means that the result is statistically s ignificant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
  
Independent
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
4.53** 5.28*** 5.28*** 5.79*** 4.53** 5.66***
(2.511) (2.836) (2.797) (3.031) (2.493) (2.989)
Mkt-RF 0.09* 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.08* 0.06
(1.755) (1.245) (1.107) (0.939) (1.662) (0.914)
SMB 0.2* 0.21** 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.12
(1.92) (2.068) (1.408) (1.618) (1.205) (1.084)
HML 0.15** 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.19** 0.11
(1.985) (1.375) (0.747) (0.332) (2.088) (0.72)
MOM -0.09 -0.07 -0.09
(-1.031) (-0.691) (-0.852)
RMW -0.18 -0.18 -0.12
(-0.959) (-0.974) (-0.651)
CMA -0.19 -0.14 -0.11
(-1.177) (-0.722) (-0.546)
Distress 0.14 0.13
(0.962) (0.967)
no. of obs. 60 60 60 60 60 60
Adjusted 7.3% 7.4% 6.8% 6.0% 8.6% 6.7%
Return of the distress risk controlled long/short value portfolio, last 5Y in sample
Dependent variable:
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In figure 8 and table 18 we can see that the long/short strategy has performed a bit better during 
2009 – 2013 compared to 2014 - 2018 measured by raw returns (6.6% vs. 5.0%), but during the 
later period the returns have been more stable and thus the Sharpe ratio has been a bit higher 
(1.09 vs. 0.95). Furthermore we can see that during the first period both the long and short 
portfolios have had highly positive returns (34.4% long and 21.1% short), whereas during the 
later period the returns have been only moderately positive (13.3% long and 4.3% short). This 
is in line with the overall market return during those periods, and this result implies that the 
distress risk eliminated value long/short strategy works in both highly positive and moderately 
positive return environments. This is quite intuitive since we are discussing about a long/short 
portfolio where the possible anomalous returns should persist regardless of the overall market 
return. Lastly we can see that the Sharpe ratios as well as returns and volatilities vary a lot more 
in the single long and short portfolios in comparison with the long/short portfolios (long/short 
volatilities between 4.6% and 6.9%, whereas and long and short portfolio volatilities are 
between 12.7% and 21.0%). This further indicates that the long/short portfolio returns are 
anomalous whereas the single long and short portfolio returns are highly dependent on the 
current market environment. 
Tables 19 and 20 compare the risk-adjusted returns of the distress risk eliminated value strategy. 
At first we notice that during both time periods the alphas are positive, but only during the last 
five years they are mostly significant. This might be partly due to the limited amount of 
observations in the subsamples, but either way we can see that the alphas between the two time 
periods differ from each other, since they are between 4.5% and 6% annually during the later 
period and only 1 - 2.7% during the earlier period. Secondly we notice that the adjusted R-
squared is below 9% in all models during 2014 – 2018, whereas they are between 20% and 30% 
during 2009 – 2013. This below 9% can be considered very low when we are discussing 
portfolio returns whereas the 30% is a bit more usual figure. The result implies that the models 
explain the distress risk eliminated value strategy returns during the earlier period to some 
extent, but the same factor portfolios are incapable of explaining the return during the later 
period. This result is further implied by the significances of the factor portfolio loadings, since 
in most models all the factor portfolio loadings are statistically insignificant during 2014 – 
2018, whereas the market, SMB and distress risk factors are significant during 2009 – 2013. 
This indicates that that even when the traditional factor portfolios are not performing, the 
distress risk eliminated value portfolio keeps producing anomalous returns. Indications that 
support this result can also be seen in figure 4, where lately the market portfolio return has been 
47 
 
very volatile, and the return of the SMB portfolio has been decreasing, whereas the distress risk 
eliminated value portfolio keeps performing during the same time period. When looking into 
the raw returns we can see that the returns of the distress risk eliminated value long/short 
portfolio are still positive at 4.2% annually during 2017 and 2018, whereas SMB and plain 
value returns are 0% and -3% during the same period arguing in favour of this interpretation.  
So overall it seems that the distress risk eliminated value strategy works during the whole 
period, though a bit better later during 2014 -2018 measured by risk-adjusted returns. This 
implies that the strategy works in both highly positive and moderately positive return 
environments. Furthermore we notice that the risk-adjusted returns being higher during the later 
period seems to be due to distress risk eliminated value strategy still performing well when the 
factor portfolios (namely market and SMB) seem to be struggling with decreasing returns. 
5.5 Result sensitivity altering value and distress risk cutoffs 
This subsection covers the results when altering the cutoffs for the portfolio selection. The Z-
score limits are increased to 6 on the long side and decreased to 1.8 for more rigorous distress  
risk cutoff and later decreased to 3 on the long side and increased to 2.6 on the short side to 
make the cutoff a bit looser. Further the amount of companies is increased to 30 in both long 
and short portfolios as well as decreased to 10. Tightening the Z-score cutoff will 
simultaneously loosen the value cutoff (P/B) and vice versa, whereas tightening/loosening the 
overall portfolio selection will have an effect on the value cutoff only. The realized mean cutoffs 
for P/B can be seen in table 21 below. Furthermore figures 9 and 10 as well as tables 22 – 27 
present the cumulative returns, Sharpe ratios and OLS regression results for these portfolios. 
 
Table 21: Realized mean P/B cutoffs for portfolios with altered selection criteria 
In the below table one can see the realized mean cutoffs for the distress risk eliminated value strategy where the 
Altman Z cutoff or amount of companies is altered from the baseline scenario. The Z-score thresholds are altered 
to 6 (long) and 1.8 (short) in the tightened Z portfolio and to 3 (long) and 2.6 (short) in the loosened Z portfolio. 
Moreover top or bottom 10 companies are chosen in both long and short portfolios in the tightened overall 
strategy based on P/B and baseline Z-score cutoffs of 5 (long) and 2.3 (short), and similarly 30 companies are 
chosen in the overall loosened portfolio. 
 
  
Long Short
Tightened Z 2.21 2.66
Loosened Z 1.02 3.38
10 (2.5%) companies 0.98 4.38
30 (7.5%) companies 2.26 2.59
Realized mean cutoffs for value
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Figure 9: Cumulative returns of the distress risk eliminated value long and short 
portfolios with altered portfolio selection criteria 
 
In the above figure one can see the time series of cumulative returns for distress risk eliminated value long and 
short portfolios during 2009 – 2018. The returns are calculated as being long in the long portfolios and short in the 
short portfolios. The altered Z-score long portfolios include 20 lowest P/B stocks with Z-Score either over 6 
(tightened) or 3 (loosened) and the similar short portfolios include 20 highest P/B stocks with Z-score lower than 
either 1.8 (tightened) or 2.6 (loosened). The overall altered long portfolios include either 10 (tightened) or 30 
(loosened) lowest P/B stocks with Z-Score over 5 and the similar short portfolios include 10 (tightened) or 30 
(loosened) highest P/B stocks with Z-score lower than 2.3. All of the portfolios are equally weighted and 
rebalanced monthly.  
 
 
 
Table 22: Sharpe ratios of the distress risk eliminated value long and short portfolios with 
altered portfolio selection criteria 
The table below represents the annualized Sharpe ratios of distress risk eliminated value long and short portfolios 
during 2009 – 2018. The portfolio selection is similar as described in figure 9 explanation. In the below naming 
of portfolios T means Tightened, starting L means loosened, Z means Z-score, O means Overall, /L means long 
portfolio and /S means short portfolio. As an example T Z/L means Tightened Z-Score Long portfolio and L O/S 
means Loosened Overall Short portfolio.  
 
 
 
  
T Z/L T Z/S L Z/L L Z/S
Sharpe ratio 1.47 1.05 1.22 1.01
T O/L T O/S L O/L L O/S
Sharpe ratio 1.32 0.99 1.37 1.05
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Figure 10: Cumulative returns of the distress risk eliminated value long/short portfolios 
with altered portfolio selection criteria 
 
In the above figure one can see the time series of cumulative returns for distress risk eliminated long/short 
portfolios during 2009 – 2018. The altered Z long portfolios include 20 lowest P/B stocks with Z-Score either over 
6 (tightened) or 3 (loosened) and the similar short portfolios include 20 highest P/B stocks with Z-score lower than 
either 1.8 (tightened) or 2.6 (loosened). The overall altered long portfolios include either 10 (tightened) or 30 
(loosened) lowest P/B stocks with Z-Score over 5 and the similar short portfolios include 10 (tightened) or 30 
(loosened) highest P/B stocks with Z-score lower than 2.3. The long/short portfolios include both the long and 
short leg of each strategy. The portfolios are equally weighted and rebalanced monthly.  
 
 
 
 
Table 23: Sharpe ratios of the distress risk eliminated value long/short portfolios with 
altered portfolio selection criteria 
The table below represents the annualized Sharpe ratios of distress risk eliminated long/short portfolios during 
2009 – 2018. The portfolio selection is similar as described in figure 10 explanation. In the below naming of 
portfolios T means Tightened, starting L means loosened, Z means Z-score, O means Overall and /LS means 
long/short portfolio. As an example T Z/LS means Tightened Z-Score Long/Short portfolio and L O/LS means 
Loosened Overall Long/Short portfolio. 
  
 
  
T Z/LS L Z/LS T O/LS L O/LS
Sharpe ratio 0.91 0.84 0.88 0.93
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Table 24: Results for the linear regressions explaining the return of the distress risk 
eliminated value portfolio with tightened Z-score thresholds 
The below table contains the linear regression results explaining the return of the distress risk eliminated value 
long/short portfolio during 2009 – 2018. The portfolio is formed from EuroStoxx600 as long positions in lowest 
20 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score higher than 6 and short positions in highest 20 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score 
lower than 1.8. The portfolio is equally weighted and rebalanced monthly. Market portfolio is the value weighted 
EuroStoxx600 long portfolio, risk-free return is the US Treasury one-month yield and the Distress risk factor 
portfolio is conducted by choosing long 20 highest Altman Z stocks and short 20 lowest Altman Z stocks from the 
EuroStoxx600 weighting the portfolio equally and rebalancing monthly. Excluding the market portfolio the FF5 
factor portfolios are the European factor portfolios from Kenneth French data library. Moreover as the distress risk 
factor portfolio is constructed as long positions in non-distressed stocks and short positions in distressed stocks, 
positive loading implies exposure towards non-distressed stocks and negative loading exposure to distressed 
stocks.  
  
 
The standard errors used in the t-stat calculations are autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust. Furthermore 
*** means that the result is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.   
 
 
  
Independent
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.67 3.91** 2.92 3.41* 2.8* 3.29*
(1.612) (2.154) (1.629) (1.897) (1.701) (1.896)
Mkt-RF 0.14*** 0.11** 0.08* 0.07 0.15*** 0.08**
(2.713) (2.265) (1.751) (1.58) (3.001) (2.069)
SMB 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.27*** 0.22***
(3.993) (3.829) (3.536) (3.463) (3.3) (2.911)
HML -0.04 -0.13* 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.24**
(-0.595) (-1.879) (1.221) (0.774) (0.86) (2.177)
MOM -0.13** -0.08 -0.1**
(-2.066) (-1.493) (-2.055)
RMW 0.11 0.12 0.21
(0.677) (0.737) (1.418)
CMA -0.48*** -0.37*** -0.32**
(-2.833) (-2.7) (-2.304)
Distress 0.28** 0.33***
(2.15) (2.964)
no. of obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120
Adjusted 12.2% 17.9% 20.2% 21.4% 18.5% 30.3%
Dependent variable:
Return of the distress risk controlled long/short value portfolio, tightened Z
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Table 25: Results for the linear regressions explaining the return of the distress risk 
eliminated value portfolio with loosened Z-score thresholds 
The below table contains the linear regression results explaining the returns of the distress risk eliminated value 
long/short portfolio during 2009 – 2018. The portfolio is formed from EuroStoxx600 as long positions in lowest 
20 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score higher than 3 and short positions in highest 20 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score 
lower than 2.6. The portfolio is equally weighted and rebalanced monthly. Market portfolio is the value weighted 
EuroStoxx600 long portfolio, risk-free return is the US Treasury one-month yield and the Distress risk factor 
portfolio is conducted by choosing long 20 highest Altman Z stocks and short 20 lowest Altman Z stocks from the 
EuroStoxx600 weighting the portfolio equally and rebalancing monthly. Excluding the market portfolio the FF5 
factor portfolios are the European factor portfolios from Kenneth French data library. Moreover as the distress risk 
factor portfolio is constructed as long positions in non-distressed stocks and short positions in distressed stocks, 
positive loading implies exposure towards non-distressed stocks and negative loading exposure to distressed 
stocks.  
 
 
The standard errors used in the t-stat calculations are autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust. Furthermore 
*** means that the result is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
 
  
Independent
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3.66* 5.66*** 3.41* 4.78** 3.66* 4.66**
(1.858) (2.692) (1.664) (2.318) (1.886) (2.32)
Mkt-RF 0.14*** 0.08* 0.09* 0.08 0.15*** 0.08
(2.717) (1.879) (1.835) (1.492) (2.775) (1.576)
SMB 0.24*** 0.18** 0.21** 0.19** 0.23** 0.17*
(2.62) (2.105) (2.233) (2.091) (2.407) (1.825)
HML 0.22*** 0.09 0.44** 0.23* 0.26*** 0.31***
(3.388) (1.335) (2.615) (1.959) (3.228) (2.702)
MOM -0.21*** -0.19*** -0.21***
(-3.564) (-4.053) (-4.137)
RMW 0.17 0.19 0.24
(0.916) (1.087) (1.411)
CMA -0.38 -0.11 -0.08
(-1.605) (-0.64) (-0.463)
Distress 0.09 0.17*
(0.743) (1.816)
no. of obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120
Adjusted 23.0% 35.4% 26.9% 35.4% 22.8% 36.7%
Dependent variable:
Return of the distress risk controlled long/short value portfolio, loosened Z
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Table 26: Results for the linear regressions explaining the return of the distress risk 
eliminated value portfolio with tightened overall portfolio selection 
The below table contains the linear regression results explaining the returns of the distress risk eliminated value 
long/short portfolio during 2009 – 2018. The portfolio is formed from EuroStoxx600 as long positions in lowest 
10 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score higher than 5 and short positions in highest 10 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score 
lower than 2.3. The portfolio is equally weighted and rebalanced monthly. Market portfolio is the value weighted 
EuroStoxx600 long portfolio, risk-free return is the US Treasury one-month yield and the Distress risk factor 
portfolio is conducted by choosing long 20 highest Altman Z stocks and short 20 lowest Altman Z stocks from the 
EuroStoxx600 weighting the portfolio equally and rebalancing monthly. Excluding the market portfolio the FF5 
factor portfolios are the European factor portfolios from Kenneth French data library. Moreover as the distress risk 
factor portfolio is constructed as long positions in non-distressed stocks and short positions in distressed stocks, 
positive loading implies exposure towards non-distressed stocks and negative loading exposure to distressed 
stocks.  
 
 
The standard errors used in the t-stat calculations are autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust. Furthermore 
*** means that the result is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
 
 
  
Independent
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3.78 5.28** 4.28 5.16** 3.78* 5.03*
(1.64) (2.453) (1.629) (2.073) (1.679) (1.846)
Mkt-RF 0.18*** 0.13*** 0.12** 0.11** 0.18*** 0.11**
(3.202) (2.753) (2.363) (2.223) (3.294) (2.404)
SMB 0.37*** 0.33*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.35*** 0.28**
(3.352) (3.039) (2.995) (2.878) (2.95) (2.535)
HML 0.12* 0.01 0.27 0.14 0.19** 0.24
(1.734) (0.207) (1.572) (0.833) (2.05) (1.515)
MOM -0.16*** -0.13** -0.15***
(-3.534) (2.536) (-2.785)
RMW 0.04 0.05 0.11
(0.14) (0.187) (0.441)
CMA -0.42** -0.23 -0.2
(-2.347) (-1.258) (-1.063)
Distress 0.16 0.22*
(1.2) (1.811)
no. of obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120
Adjusted 17.5% 23.4% 20.4% 23.1% 18.2% 25.0%
Dependent variable:
Return of the distress risk controlled long/short value portfolio, tightened overall
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Table 27: Results for the linear regressions explaining the return of the distress risk 
eliminated value portfolio with loosened overall portfolio selection 
The below table contains the linear regression results explaining the returns of the distress risk eliminated value 
long/short portfolio during 2009 – 2018. The portfolio is formed from EuroStoxx600 as long positions in lowest 
30 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score higher than 5 and short positions in highest 30 P/B stocks with Altman Z-score 
lower than 2.3. The portfolio is equally weighted and rebalanced monthly. Market portfolio is the value weighted 
EuroStoxx600 long portfolio, risk-free return is the US Treasury one-month yield and the Distress risk factor 
portfolio is conducted by choosing long 20 highest Altman Z stocks and short 20 lowest Altman Z stocks from the 
EuroStoxx600 weighting the portfolio equally and rebalancing monthly. Excluding the market portfolio the FF5 
factor portfolios are the European factor portfolios from Kenneth French data library. Moreover as the distress risk 
factor portfolio is constructed as long positions in non-distressed stocks and short positions in distressed stocks, 
positive loading implies exposure towards non-distressed stocks and negative loading exposure to distressed 
stocks.  
  
 
The standard errors used in the t-stat calculations are autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust. Furthermore 
*** means that the result is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Independent
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.43* 3.29** 2.8 3.41* 2.55* 3.04*
(1.683) (2.095) (1.639) (1.682) (1.718) (1.821)
Mkt-RF 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.1*** 0.08* 0.15*** 0.1***
(4.276) (3.198) (2.721) (1.725) (4.706) (2.735)
SMB 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.33*** 0.25*** 0.21***
(4.156) (3.751) (3.41) (3.849) (3.824) (2.94)
HML 0.03 -0.03 0.15 0.15 0.1 0.19
(0.503) (-0.571) (1.199) (1.013) (1.547) (1.64)
MOM -0.09* -0.13** -0.07*
(-1.891) (-2.153) (-1.686)
RMW 0.03 0.13 0.09
(0.161) (0.623) (0.553)
CMA -0.33** -0.13 -0.23
(-2.169) (-0.707) (-1.631)
Distress 0.18* 0.21**
(1.796) (2.315)
no. of obs. 120 120 120 120 120 120
Adjusted 17.5% 20.7% 21.6% 22.1% 20.4% 26.2%
Dependent variable:
Return of the distress risk controlled long/short value portfolio, loosened overall
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Figures 9 and 10 represent the cumulative returns of the long, short and long/short portfolios 
with altered portfolio selection criteria. We can see that both the long and short as well as the 
long/short portfolio returns are of similar scale with each other with some difference in 
characteristics. We can see that the overall tightened long portfolio produces the highest 
cumulative returns and the corresponding short portfolio has the highest returns from the short 
side. We also notice that the returns of the overall tightened long/short portfolio are the highest 
within this group of portfolios, but its return is the most volatile as well. The average annualized 
return of these long portfolios are 22 – 27%, where the overall tightened portfolio returns are 
the highest at 27% and overall loosened portfolio returns are the lowest at 22%. The other long 
portfolio returns are between 23.6% and 24.5% including the baseline portfolio. Furthermore 
the short portfolio returns are between 12.5% and 14.6%, where the overall tightened short 
portfolio return is 14.6% and all the other portfolio returns are between 12.5% and 13.3%  
including the baseline short portfolio. The long/short portfolio returns are between 4.6% and 
6.3% annually, again highest in the overall tightened and lowest in the overall loosened 
portfolio. 
Further in tables 22 and 23 we can see that the Sharpe ratios are quite close to each other with 
similar portfolios. The long portfolio Sharpe ratios are between 1.22 and 1.47, short portfolio 
ratios between 0.99 and 1.05 and long/short portfolio ratios between 0.84 and 0.93. Here we 
notice that the overall tightened long/short portfolio has, even though the highest return, the 
second lowest Sharpe ratio. This is due to the higher volatility of the portfolio (7.2% compared 
to 5 – 6% in other portfolios), which is likely due to the low amount of stocks in the portfolio 
(only 10 in both legs). This low amount of stocks leads to single stocks having a large impact 
on the overall portfolio return. Furthermore we note that the baseline long/short portfolio Sharpe  
ratio of 1.06 is the highest within the long/short portfolios. Therefore it seems that larger 
emphasis on neither value nor distress enhances the current strategy. Again plain optimizat ion 
could create more value to the strategy, but it could also overfit the data.  
Tables 24 – 27 present the OLS regression results for the long/short portfolios with altered 
screening criteria. All portfolio alphas are mostly significant between 2.4% and 5.7%, but there 
are some interesting characteristics noticeably different between the portfolios. Firstly it seems 
that when the value cutoff is loosened, the alphas drop (Tightened Z and loosened overall 
portfolio alphas between 2.4% and 3.9%, whereas other portfolios between 3.4% and 5.7%). 
The adjusted R-squared seems to be lower with tighter Altman Z cutoffs (10-20% in tight 
Altman Z and 20-35% in the loosened Altman Z). It also seems that tightening the Z-score 
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threshold increases the SMB loading and decreases HML loading (0.3 vs. 0.2 loading on SMB 
and 0 vs. 0.3 loading on HML with the tightened Z and loosened Z portfolios). Furthermore 
more rigorous value cutoffs increase the negative MOM loading (significant 0.2 in loosened Z 
and tightened overall, mostly insignificant 0.1 loading in others). Lastly it seems that more 
rigorous Z-score cutoff decreases the loading on distressed stocks (0.3 in tightened Z, otherwise 
0.2). 
These results indicate that it is important to have a clear value cutoff between the long and short 
side portfolios, and furthermore that more rigorous overall portfolio selection increases the raw 
returns and alphas of the strategy. However we must bear in mind that the small amount of 
stocks in the overall tightened portfolio might lead to higher volatility and lower Sharpe ratio 
comparing to portfolios with less rigorous cutoffs. Furthermore it seems that tighter Altman Z 
thresholds decrease the explanatory power of the traditional factors. It also seems that tightening 
the Z-score cutoffs moves the factor loading from HML to SMB, which implies that the 
portfolio returns are likely to be due to size anomaly after the distress risk elimination. 
Moreover it seems that the more rigorous the value cutoffs, the more the strategy invests against 
the Momentum strategy and that the more rigorous the Altman Z thresholds, the less the strategy 
loads on distressed stocks. 
6 DISCUSSION 
This chapter first discusses the possibility to implement the distress risk eliminated value 
strategy, mainly the short side of it since it can be considered more difficult. Further the section 
discusses the implications of the results and compares them with previous literature. 
6.1 Implementing the strategy 
Implementing the long side strategy sounds quite trivial since these companies (EuroStoxx600) 
are basically the largest in Europe. Of course with huge investments it could be possible to dry 
up the whole liquidity in the market from the long side as well, but rather the possibility to short 
these companies should be considered to be the challenge. To monitor the possibility to short 
these stocks as well as to see what it costs, the Finnish companies included in the EuroStoxx600 
index on 31/12/2018 are used as an example to find out whether shorting these stocks is possible 
and not too costly. In table 28 below one can see the Finnish companies that that are included 
in the EuroStoxx600 index on 31/12/2018. The possibility to short all these stocks either via 
stock lending or liquid derivatives market is investigated. 
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Table 28: List of Finnish companies included in the EuroStoxx600 on 31/12/2018 
 
When going through the list of stocks we notice that it includes Amer Sports, which was sold 
private on 3/2019 and therefore during the time of writing (4/2019) it is no longer possible to 
short Amer. However, it has been possible to short Amer during 2018, since the author of this 
study has been short Amer all the way until the end of year 2018.  
Appendix I lists the Finnish stocks available for stock lending via Nordnet on 13/3/2019. In this 
list we can find all the stocks found in the EuroStoxx 600 Finnish companies list excluding 
Neste and Amer. Appendix I further includes a list of derivatives that create a possibility to 
short Neste in Nordnet. Here we see that the list is long, and with this many products the 
available liquidity for shorting seems quite good. When opening one of the products, a 
certificate with a constant leverage of 2, we can see that the product costs 7.5EUR and there are 
15 000 papers available with a bid/ask spread of 0.3%. Other costs of utilizing this product are 
1% over the risk free rate (EONIA) annually as an index and leverage fee. Therefore it seems 
that with only one product it is possible for anyone to short via this market at least with 7.5*15 
000*2 = 225kEUR with quite moderate fees. When going through the list there are multiple 
products for each underlying varying in leverage, issuer, product type etc. but the liquidity of 
these products is quite similar with each other. Therefore it seems possible to short these stocks 
via both the derivatives market and stock lending. The other question is whether the cost of 
shorting is too large to eat up all the profits. Therefore the cost to short these stocks with simple 
derivatives is discussed below via two examples. 
Finnish companies
UPM-KYMMENE OY
ELISA CORPORAT
KONE CORPORATI
VALMET CORP.
SAMPO A
ORION B
METSO
WARTSILA B
NOKIAN RENKAAT
KESKO B
FORTUM
AMER SPORTS A
KONECRANES OYJ
NESTE
HUHTAMAKI OYJ
STORA ENSO R
NOKIA
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Taking this analysis further, two hypothetical short cases during 2018 are investigated, one in 
which the short position return is clearly negative (Nokia) and one in which the return is clearly 
positive (Nokian Renkaat). The returns of these positions are calculated from the Thomson 
Reuters data without taking into account transaction costs as well as by implementing the short 
with a bear tracker certificate taking into account the transaction cost, bid-ask spread and index 
and leverage fee for the products during 2018. The products utilized are BEAR NOKIA X1 
NORDNET F and BEAR NRE NF short tracker certificates which just track the short position 
return without any additional leverage. The bid-ask spread for these products has been at 0.2% 
during 2018 and the transaction cost is between 0.06% and 0.2% in Nordnet for the usual 
customer varying on how much one trades. The available liquidity with these bid-ask spreads 
is at 100kEUR, meaning that a strategy with up to 4mEUR to invest would be sufficed with a 
single product like this for each of the stocks shorted. With annual rebalancing, the transaction 
cost would be 0.2% for each trade and with monthly rebalancing 20 stocks long and 20 stocks 
short the cost would be 0.1% for each trade.  
With BEAR NOKIA X1 NORDNET F the return is -34.7% during 2018 including only the 
index and leverage fee, whereas the same Nokia short return is -34.1% with the Thomson 
Reuters data without taking into account any transaction costs. Similar figures for BEAR NRE 
NF and Nokian Renkaat short are +25.0% with the certificate and +25.7% with the Thomson 
Reuters data. This indicates that the index and leverage fee has been between 0.6% and 0.7% 
during 2018, which is in line with the products stating that the fee is 1% + EONIA rate. When 
we add all the costs together we remain with 0.1% (bid) + 0.2% (buy) + 0.6% (Index and 
leverage) + 0.1% (ask) + 0.2% (sell) = 1.2% cost for the short side and 0.4% for the long side 
taking into account transaction costs and assuming a zero bid-ask for the long positions. This 
means an overall fee of 0.8% annually for the whole portfolio with annual rebalancing. For 
monthly rebalancing the costs would rise to 0.1%*12 (bid) + 0.1%*12 (buy) + 0.6% (Index and 
leverage) + 0.1%*12 (ask) + 0.1%*12 (sell) = 5.4% annually for the short side and 0.2*12 = 
2.4% annually for the long side, adding up to a total cost of 3.9% for the whole strategy. This 
would practically eat up all the alpha from the strategy with monthly rebalancing.  
When looking at the calculations above we must keep in mind that these are list prices for all 
customers meaning that with reasonable amount of capital both the transaction costs including 
the bid/ask as well as the index and leverage fee could decrease. One way to look at this is that 
the plain transaction fee for each deal is the largest single part of the overall fee with these 
products instead of the product specific fees. This means that a simple long strategy with for 
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example 40 stocks and monthly rebalancing would cost 2.4% annually which can be considered 
high at least for a large investor considering the amount of trading involved.  
As stated previously, one other way to implement the short leg would be stock lending. All 
these Finnish stocks excluding Neste are available to stock lending in Nordnet, but in this 
approach neither the amount of stocks available for shorting nor the cost of lending are as 
transparent as for the derivatives. Further argument for using these derivatives is that margin 
calls are not an issue with them, whereas with stock lending it is possible that there would be a 
need to post additional collateral after markets move. However there is one additional risk when 
using derivatives, and that is counterparty credit risk. In other words there is a risk that the 
issuer of the derivatives defaults after which the current owner of these products doesn’t get 
paid. This problem can be mitigated with a collateral agreement with the issuer, but these 
agreements again mean the possibility for margin calls both ways. 
Overall it seems that with 12M holding period the costs could be lower than the strategy alpha 
(0.8% cost vs. 2.5 – 4% alpha annually), but with 1M holding periods the costs would rise at 
least very close to the alpha (3.9% cost and 4 – 5% alpha annually) with list prices. However, 
one thing to note here is that we cover list prices available for everyone, and with more trading 
and more capital available the prices are likely to drop, since the largest single cost with the 
current price is the fixed transaction fee that is 0.1% at lowest every time when making a trade. 
6.2 Implications of the results 
Firstly on the overall results during the whole sample period from 2009 – 2018 with 1M holding 
periods we notice that the rating cutoffs do not seem to work, since the cumulative returns of 
value long/short portfolio based on ratings are not different from zero. This is in line with 
Piotroski (2000), who states that all the value that the distress risk measures add come from the 
operating profitability and efficiency metrics and not from for example leverage. Furthermore 
we note that both the long and short portfolios of the distress risk eliminated strategy are better 
than the comparable plain value portfolios measuring by Sharpe ratios. It seems to be equally 
possible to find distressed glamour stocks to be short than it is to find non-distressed value to 
be long. Further it seems that shorting these distressed glamour stocks instead of non-distressed 
glamour enhances the return of the strategy. From the long side these results are in line with 
Griffin and Lemmon (2002), Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Piotroski (2000). The findings from 
the short side are new and they imply that it is possible to find overpriced distressed companies 
to short as well as underpriced non-distressed companies to be long. This result is in line with 
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the mispricing theory of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) as well as my second and 
third hypotheses. The regression results imply the same, since the alphas are positive and 
significant (4-5% annually with FF5, MOM and Distress risk factors) with the distress risk 
eliminated value long/short portfolio, but not on the plain value portfolio. The alphas are also 
higher than those of Griffin and Lemmon (2.3% annually) which is likely due to the added short 
portfolio. Furthermore it seems that the plain value strategy loads on distressed stocks, and the 
distress risk eliminated value portfolio on non-distressed. This distress risk factor loading is a 
new result, and it is in line with my first hypothesis and Fama and French (1993) stating that 
part of the plain value strategy returns can be explained by elevated distress risk of value stocks. 
The results are also in line with Griffin and Lemmon (2002) who find that distressed stocks 
include many small cap value stocks as well as they are in line with my second hypothesis and 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), since the value strategy returns can still be found when 
eliminating distress risk. Additionally we find that the distress risk eliminated value strategy 
loads significantly on market, SMB and MOM factors (MOM loading negative, others 
positive), whereas with the plain value strategy also the HML loading is significantly positive. 
The market, SMB and MOM factor loadings are in line with Agarwal and Taffler (2008), even 
though they are only considering long portfolios.  Lastly we note that the plain distress risk 
long/short portfolio does not provide returns different from zero. This contradicts with the 
results of Malik and Aftab (2013) who find distressed companies to overperform, but is in line 
with Anginer and Yildizhan (2017) who find that on average distress risk is priced correctly in 
the market. 
Secondly from comparing the results with longer holding periods of 3M and 12M we see that 
the 1M holding period is able to provide the highest and most stable return for both the long 
and short sides individually as well as for the long/short portfolio. Furthermore we note that the 
alphas decrease gradually with longer holding periods, though still staying positive for the 
distress risk eliminated value strategy. The plain value strategy alphas are zero in all models 
with both 3M and 12M holding periods. The mentioned shorter holding period outperformance  
might be due to faster reaction to either value signals from the market or to new accounting 
information with these shorter holding periods. These results add value to Piotroski (2000), 
Agarwal and Taffler (2008) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002) for example, who only consider 
12M holding periods in their studies. Furthermore the results show that the distress risk factor 
loading increases (as do SMB, HML and MOM loadings) with longer holding periods. This 
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might be due to traditional factors gaining more explanatory power when the reaction to distress 
signals becomes slower. 
Thirdly from comparing the results during 2009 – 2013 and 2014 – 2018 we notice that the 
distress risk eliminated value strategy works in both highly positive and moderately positive 
return environments and further that the strategy works even a bit better during the later period. 
During 2009 – 2013 it seems that the market and SMB portfolios explain the distress risk 
eliminated value long/short portfolio return quite well. However we notice that during 2014 – 
2018 none of the factor portfolios is able to explain the return of the distress risk eliminated 
value portfolio significantly, and during that period the portfolio yields 4.5 – 6% annual alphas. 
Looking into figure 4 it seems that the anomalous returns of the distress risk eliminated value 
portfolio persist even when the traditional factor portfolio returns seem to decrease. These 
results are well in line with the mispricing theory of Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
and my second hypothesis. However, we must also keep in mind that some of these results 
might be due to small subsample sizes (only 60 observations during both time periods). 
7 CONCLUSION 
This paper utilizes data of EuroStoxx600 companies on a time period of 01/2009 – 12/2018 to 
study whether eliminating distress risk exposure enhances the returns of a value strategy. My 
hypotheses are that 1. Plain value long portfolio stocks are on average more distressed than 
those of the plain value short portfolio, 2. Eliminating distress risk exposure enhances the plain 
value portfolio performance 3. It is possible to find distressed glamour stocks from the market, 
and these stocks underperform other glamour. The first hypothesis is based on Fama and French 
(1993) risk-based approach stating that value anomaly returns are due to higher distress risk of 
value stocks compared to glamour stocks and the second and third hypotheses based on 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) mispricing theory which states that value anomaly 
returns are due to investor sentiment underpricing value stocks and overpricing glamour. The 
most important results are that: 
1. It is possible to find distressed glamour stocks in the market. 
2. These distressed glamour stocks are a better short leg for the non-distressed value 
strategy than non-distressed glamour stocks are. 
3. The performance of the distress risk eliminated value long/short portfolio is high during 
the whole period, even when the traditional factor portfolios don’t perform. 
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The first two points show that distress risk is not priced correctly in glamour stocks whereas 
the last point indicates that utilizing this incorrect pricing of distress risk, it is possible to 
outperform the traditional value long/short portfolios. 
More specifically the results show that a distress risk eliminated value long/short portfolio is 
able to beat the plain value long/short strategy by raw returns (6.0% vs. 3.6% annually), Sharpe 
ratios (1.06 vs. 0.39) and risk-adjusted returns during the whole time period 2009 - 2018. More 
specifically they show that the distress risk eliminated value strategy yields 4-5% statistically 
and economically significant annual alphas, whereas the plain value portfolio alphas remain 
mostly insignificant. This result is in line with my second hypothesis. Moreover it seems that 
the plain value portfolio loads on distressed stocks, which further implies that some of the plain  
value strategy returns are due to increased distress exposure. This is in line with my first 
hypothesis. Further the results show that both the long (Sharpe ratios 1.39 vs. 1.18) and short 
(Sharpe ratios 0.96 vs. 1.09) legs of the distress risk eliminated value strategy are able to 
outperform the same leg of the plain value strategy. This implies that also the short leg with 
distressed glamour stocks that has not been studied previously adds value to the strategy. It also 
seems that it is as possible to find distressed glamour stocks as it is to find non-distressed value 
and that these distressed glamour stocks are a better short leg for the strategy than non-
distressed glamour, since both the return is higher (6.0% vs. 2.7%) and the volatility is lower 
(5.7% vs. 6.3%) with the distressed short leg. 
Dividing the data into two separate time periods 2009 – 2013 and 2014 – 2018 shows that the 
distress risk eliminated value strategy works in both highly positive and moderately positive 
return environments. Furthermore this analysis shows that the strategy returns persist even 
though the traditional factor portfolios suffer from decreasing returns, and therefore during 
2014 - 2018 the annual alphas have been higher than during 2009 – 2013, between 4.5% and 
6% annually during the later period.  
Lastly, when comparing different holding periods for the strategy it seems that the 1M holding 
period provides the highest return comparing with 3M and 12M periods (6% vs. 5% annually). 
This implies that faster reaction to accounting information or to new indication of value 
enhances the returns of the strategy. What remains to be studied on the subject is whether the 
same results also apply during bear markets, and whether it adds value to further optimize the 
distress risk and value tradeoff for the strategy. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix I: Shortable stocks from Finland in Nordnet
  
https://www.nordnet.fi/mux/page/blankninginl.html 
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Appendix I continues, example of Neste derivatives
 
https://www.nordnet.fi/mux/web/marknaden/kurslista/warranter.html?flerSokfalt=1&selectedt
ab=Overview&sortcolumn=shortname&sortorder=ascending&currency=EUR&firstLevelIssu
er=&instrument=16102550&market_view=D&instr_group_type=&instr_type=&issuer=&dat
e=& 
